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Case No. 20180024-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

ERNEST CLAYTON HARPER,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
INTRODUCTION
Ernest Clayton Harper pleaded guilty to stalking. The plea agreement
provided, “The State agrees to a two-step 76-3-402 reduction if I comply 100%
with all terms and conditions of AP&P probation.” Harper moved to
withdraw his guilty plea after he found out that AP&P was going to
recommend prison. Harper argued that his plea was unknowing and
involuntary because he was pressured into pleading due to his mental
condition, and his attorney at the time told him he was guaranteed probation.
Harper has changed tack on appeal, arguing that the prosecutor
promised to recommend probation but breached that agreement.
Alternatively, he argues that the language of the plea agreement misled him

into thinking the prosecutor was going to recommend probation. He also
argues that if the prosecutor did not intend to recommend probation,
Harper’s counsel was ineffective for not making the prosecutor correct his
contrary “false statement” in the plea agreement.
This case also involves a consolidated appeal with another stalking
case of Harper’s. But Harper has withdrawn his claim of error in the other
case. Harper suggests that severance of the two appellate cases is necessary
because of a supposed jurisdictional defect in that other case. While the Court
may sever the cases, severance is not necessary because any jurisdictional
problem would be limited to the specific case in which it arises.
While there is no jurisdictional problem in the appeal Harper has
abandoned, this Court does not have jurisdiction in the appeal that Harper
has not abandoned. Harper filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea,
but he did not challenge his plea on the bases he now raises. This Court has
held that the Plea Withdrawal Statute bars appellate consideration—even for
plain error or ineffective assistance—of challenges not specifically raised
below.
If this Court disagrees that Harper’s challenges are unpreserved, it
should affirm the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.
Harper has not established that his plea was unknowing or involuntary.
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Because the language of the plea agreement is ambiguous, Harper had to
present extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. He presented no evidence to
establish that the prosecutor agreed to recommend probation or that Harper
genuinely and legitimately thought that the prosecutor had done so.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Is severance of the consolidated appeal necessary?
Standard of Review. Because this issue arises for the first time on appeal,
addresses the authority of the appellate court, and does not ask this Court to
review any (in)action by the district court, no standard of review applies.
2. Does this Court have jurisdiction to address challenges to Harper’s
guilty plea that he did not raise in his timely motion to withdraw that plea?
Standard of Review. Same as for Issue 1.
3. If this Court has jurisdiction, did the district court act within its
discretion when it concluded that Harper had not shown that his plea was
unknowing or involuntary?
Standard of Review. A court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Magness, 2017 UT App 130, ¶16, 402
P.3d 105.
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4. If this Court has jurisdiction, has Harper proved that counsel was
ineffective for not requiring the prosecutor to clarify during the plea colloquy
that the plea bargain did not contain a promise to recommend probation?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to a claim of
ineffective assistance brought for the first time on appeal. State v. Bunker, 2019
UT App 118, ¶8, --- P.3d ----.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This consolidated appeal involves two cases against Ernest Clayton
Harper in which the district court imposed prison sentences during a global
sentencing.
The First Case
In case 131401036 (the first case), Harper pleaded guilty to one count
of third-degree felony stalking for violating a civil stalking injunction
obtained by his now ex-wife. R036:4, 38, 50. 1 The probable cause statement
accompanying the information stated that the same day his ex-wife received
the injunction, Harper texted her and sent a topless picture of her to her

The State cites the record using the last three digits of the trial court
case number in italics, with a colon preceding the page number in the case
record. Thus, “R036:4” refers to page 4 in the record of the first case (case
131401036).
1
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family members and employer and posted it online. R036:2–3. After pleading
guilty, Harper was placed on probation. R036:81.
The First Appeal of the First Case
Harper appealed after the court sentenced him to probation, with the
appellate case designated as 20140030-CA. R036:92, 111–12. But on appeal,
Harper did not challenge his sentence; rather, he challenged his plea despite
not having moved to withdraw his plea before his sentence was announced.
R036:396–97. This Court summarily dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. R036:396–97.
Revocation of Probation in the First Case
Twenty-one months after sentencing, Harper admitted that he violated
the terms of his probation by contacting his ex-wife, but the court continued
probation. R036:207, 336. About a year and a half later, Harper’s probation
officers arrested him for suspected custodial interference when he did not
return his son to Harper’s ex-wife. R036:480. As he was transported to jail,
Harper kicked one officer several times and head-butted another. R036:480.
Harper later admitted he violated his probation by committing attempted
assault by a prisoner. R036:714, 720–21. The court revoked Harper’s
probation and imposed the original 0 to 5-year prison sentence. R036:604–05.
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The Second Appeal of the First Case
Harper appealed from the order revoking his probation and imposing
the original prison sentence, with the appellate case designated as 20180250CA. R036:615, 631. This is one of the appeals at issue here.
The Second Case
In case 161911938 (the second case), 2 the probable cause affidavit
averred that Harper sent hundreds of texts to an ex-girlfriend over a threeweek period and threatened to send nude pictures of her to her employer to
get her fired; he also went to his ex-girlfriend’s apartment complex after
management had told him not to return, and he would not leave when they
told him to. R938:2. 3
Harper was charged with criminal trespass, a class B misdemeanor,
and stalking, originally filed as a third-degree felony and later amended to a
second. R938:1–2, 78. With the assistance of counsel (plea counsel), Harper

Although the global sentencing involved resolution of more than two
cases against Harper, the State uses the “first” and “second” designations for
ease of reference.
2

This occurred while Harper was still on probation in the first case,
about a year after the court had continued probation and about eight months
before Harper assaulted the probation officers. R036:431, 480. The court
entered an order to show cause in the first case based on the allegations in the
second case, but with the parties’ agreement the court held the matter
pending resolution of the second case. R036:437, 452, 458.
3
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pleaded guilty to stalking as a second-degree felony. R938:160, 166. In
exchange, the trespassing charge was dropped and the State agreed to
recommend release to Adult Probation & Parole supervision “pending
sentencing.” R938:160. The plea statement also said, “The State agrees to a
two-step 76-3-402 reduction if I comply 100% with all terms and conditions
of AP&P probation.” R938:160. But Harper volunteered at the hearing that he
“realize[d] that the penalty of this guilty plea could … put [him] in prison.”
R938:597. And during the subsequent colloquy Harper confirmed that he
understood when the court said it could sentence him to prison even though
“[s]omething less may be recommended.” R938:602. The court accepted the
plea, ordered Harper’s release, and directed AP&P to complete a presentence
investigation (PSI) report. R938:604–05.

. The motion did not state a basis for withdrawal. R938:184.
Represented by new counsel (withdrawal counsel), Harper later filed another
motion to withdraw the plea in which he argued that his plea was
involuntary because of his emotional instability at the time, and it was
unknowing because his plea counsel’s advice had misled him. R938:306–07.
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Harper provided a declaration stating that his plea counsel “told me I’ll get
probation” and that Harper “did not know that by pleading guilty, I could be
sent to prison.” R938:309. He added, “I did not know that AP&P would
recommend prison.” R938:309.
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Harper’s
withdrawal counsel acknowledged that Harper understood the court could
impose imprisonment, but he argued that Harper “expected that he would
get probation.” R938:632. He pointed to Harper’s emotional instability and
the statement of his plea counsel “that he would get probation if he pled as
charged.” R938:631–33. Harper’s withdrawal counsel also pointed to the
language of the plea agreement, which said the State would agree to a twostep reduction “if I comply 100% with all terms and conditions of AP&P
probation.” R938:160, 631–32, 635–36, 639. His withdrawal counsel argued
that, at least to a non-lawyer, that language “clearly would imply” that “the
State is agreeing that he will receive probation.” R938:631–32. His withdrawal
counsel stated that Harper would not have had “a problem with the plea” if
AP&P and the prosecutor recommended probation. R938:636. But he claimed
that given the language of the plea agreement and his plea counsel’s
“statement that he would get probation,” Harper “was misled” into pleading
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guilty. R938:636, 639. His withdrawal counsel made no proffer of what
Harper actually understood the language of the plea agreement to mean.
The prosecutor proffered that “we never talked about probation being
agreed upon,” and he emphasized that it would have been in the plea
statement if it was part of the agreement. R938:635.
The district court found that Harper understood that prison was a
possibility when he pleaded guilty and that there was no basis for Harper
thinking “he had a guarantee of probation.” R938:639. The court noted that it
had told Harper he could be sentenced to prison, and the court found it “very
difficult to think” that Harper’s plea counsel “would have ever told him that
there wasn’t a possibility of prison and that what the sentence was would be
up to the judge.” R938:638. The court denied the motion, explaining that
“find[ing] out he has a prison recommendation” was not a valid basis to
withdraw a plea. R938:638.
Sentencing on the Second Case
After the district court denied Harper’s motion to withdraw his plea,
but before sentencing, Harper—who was still represented by counsel at the
time—sent the court a dozen letters or pro se motions addressing his plea.
R938:339–51, 357, 370, 381–85, 433, 439–51, 455, 458–60, 488–98, 506, 510, 514–
16. In them, Harper acknowledged that the court would decide what sentence

-9-

to impose, but he argued that he had “sign[ed] a deal for probation with the
prosecutor”; Harper asked either for the prosecutor to “keep the deal it
made” or for the court to allow withdrawal of the plea if the prosecutor was
going to “recommend prison.” R938:339–51, 357, 370, 381–85, 433, 439–51,
455, 458–60, 488–98, 506, 510, 514–16.
Harper was represented by new counsel at sentencing (sentencing
counsel), and she argued for probation. As part of that argument, she pointed
to the language of the plea agreement about a 402 reduction. R938:736.
Stating that she had “no idea how an argument could be made that this didn’t
agree to probation,” Harper’s sentencing counsel asserted that such language
“would never be part of a potential prison sentence recommendation,” or at
least would be a “very confusing” way to word an agreement that allowed
for a prison recommendation. R938:736. Still, his sentencing counsel did not
argue that the prosecutor was bound to recommend probation or that the
prosecutor breached any such agreement, nor did she ask the court to
reconsider its denial of Harper’s motion to withdraw his plea.
The prosecutor argued for imprisonment. R938:751–52. The court
imposed a 1 to 15-year sentence. R938:549–50. 4

This sentence was imposed at the same hearing in which the court
revoked Harper’s probation on the first case. R938:549–50.
4
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Appeal of the Second Case
Harper timely appealed from the final order in his second case, with
the appellate case designated as 20180024-CA. R938:571, 575. 5 Upon Harper’s
motion, this Court consolidated this appeal with his second appeal of the first
case (20180250-CA), with the consolidated appellate case designated as
20180024-CA. R036:639.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As an initial matter, Harper argues that this Court must sever the
appeals in the first and second cases, presumably because he believes there is
a jurisdictional defect in the appeal of the first case. While the Court may
sever the cases, doing so is not necessary. There is no jurisdictional defect in
the first case, and Harper has abandoned his challenge in that case anyway.
The Court need only affirm.
In the second case, Harper argues for the first time on appeal that the
plea agreement included a promise that the prosecutor would recommend
probation and the prosecutor was required to fulfill that promise. Harper
claims that the breach rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary.

Harper had earlier filed a notice of appeal from a non-final order in
the second case, with the appellate case designated as 20170662-CA.
R938:355, 590. This Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
R938:590–91. That earlier appeal is not at issue here.
5
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Alternatively, Harper argues that he was misled into understanding that the
prosecutor would recommend probation, and that if the prosecutor never
intended to do so, Harper pleaded guilty without understanding the actual
value of the bargain he made. Finally, Harper argues that if there was no
promise to recommend probation, his plea counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to the prosecutor’s contrary, “false” statement in the plea agreement
and demanding during the plea colloquy that the prosecutor correct or clarify
it.
This Court does not have jurisdiction over any of the challenges in
Harper’s second case. As this Court held in State v. Badikyan, a timely motion
to withdraw a guilty plea is insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction over
challenges that are not raised in the motion. All of Harper’s appellate
challenges are new. His trial motion focused on his own mental condition and
his misunderstanding that he was guaranteed probation, based on the
language of the plea agreement and his plea counsel’s assurances. Harper
never alerted the district court to his argument that he thought he was
entitled to a probation recommendation from the State. And he never presented
any evidence about what he believed the prosecutor had promised to do.
Finally, Harper essentially concedes that he did not raise his claim that his
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plea counsel should have demanded that the prosecutor clarify or correct the
statements in the plea agreement.
But if this Court concludes that Harper preserved his challenges, it
should reject them because Harper did not present evidence to prove that his
plea was unknowing or involuntary. No evidence establishes that the
prosecutor promised to recommend probation, and the prosecutor’s proffer
directly refutes any assertion of such a promise. Harper had the burden to
prove his claim, and he failed to do so.
Furthermore, even if there were a promise to recommend probation, at
most that would entitle Harper to resentencing before a different judge where
the prosecutor makes the recommendation. But even so, the State would be
excused from performing that obligation because Harper’s subsequent
criminal activity amounted to a breach of an implied promise to not change
the circumstances under which the parties reached their agreement.
The evidence is also insufficient to show that Harper was genuinely
and legitimately misled by the language in the plea agreement. On the record
Harper created below, Harper cannot show an abuse of discretion in the
district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.
Finally, if this Court has jurisdiction over Harper’s ineffectiveassistance claim, it should dismiss the claim as inadequately briefed.
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ARGUMENT
I.
Any jurisdictional defect in either appeal affects only
that appeal; this Court has jurisdiction in the first case
and should affirm because Harper has abandoned his
appellate challenge.
Harper suggests that this Court should vacate its order consolidating
the appeals in the first and second cases. 6 Br.Aplt.5. Harper seems to imply
that doing so is necessary “in order for this Court to separately rule” on the
merits of his appeal in the second case. Br.Aplt.5. The logic of Harper’s
argument seems to be that (1) this Court dismissed Harper’s first appeal in
the first case for lack of jurisdiction; (2) that jurisdictional ruling “is
controlling” in the second appeal of the first case; and (3) any jurisdictional
defect in the first case necessarily infects the second case as well. Br.Aplt.5.
This Court may vacate its consolidation order, but doing so is not
necessary to reach the merits of either the first or second appeal. There is no
jurisdictional defect in the first case. Harper’s second appeal of the first case—
which he now abandons—is jurisdictionally distinct from his first appeal of

Although Harper’s brief says he “moves to vacate the prior order of
consolidation,” Harper has not filed a motion to vacate. Br.Aplt.5. But that
would not prevent the Court from doing so on its own motion.
6
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the first case. But even if there were a jurisdictional defect in his first case, it
could not affect this Court’s authority to rule on the issues in the second case.
In the first appeal of the first case, this Court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction under the Plea Withdrawal Statute, Utah Code §77-13-6, because
Harper challenged the validity of his guilty plea on appeal but he had not
filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea in the first case. R036:396–
97.
Harper’s second appeal in the first case does not challenge the validity
of his guilty plea. Rather, it ostensibly challenges the probation revocation in
the first case. Br.Aplt.5. This Court would have jurisdiction to address any
post-plea orders that Harper challenges in his first case, including the
revocation of his probation. See NPEC LLC v. Miller, 2018 UT App 85, ¶¶4–10,
427 P.3d 357 (per curiam) (concluding that law of the case barred
consideration of issues in second appeal that did not “challenge actions
occurring after the dismissal of his first appeal”); State v. Scott, 2017 UT App
103, ¶¶8–9, 400 P.3d 1172 (concluding that court had jurisdiction to address
sentence but not guilty plea).
But Harper has now withdrawn his challenge to the district court’s
probation revocation in the first case. Br.Aplt.5. He concedes that the
probation revocation “cannot be legitimately deemed to be legally
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unreasonable or excessive under governing law.” Br.Aplt.5. Where Harper
has abandoned his challenge to the probation revocation, the proper ruling
in the first case is not dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, but affirmance.
Even so, any possible jurisdictional problem in the first case does not
require severing the two cases on appeal. Any preclusive effect that this
Court’s prior dismissal had can at most affect the first case. Consolidation on
appeal does not erase the distinct identities of multiple cases. See Pulham v.
Kirsling, 2019 UT 18, ¶¶22, 45, 443 P.3d 1217 (analyzing limits on appellate
jurisdiction over one appeal separate from substantive issues in second
consolidated appeal); State v. Earl, 2015 UT 12, ¶13, 345 P.3d 1153 (affirming
“the decisions in both of the consolidated cases” and remanding for further
consideration). Just as the jurisdictional limits of the Plea Withdrawal Statute
are applied to specific issues raised within one case and not necessarily the
entire case, see Scott, 2017 UT App 103, ¶¶8–9, any jurisdictional defect in the
first case based on the Plea Withdrawal Statute cannot reach the second case,
even if the two are consolidated for purposes of appeal.
Although this Court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal in the second
case, as argued below in Point II, the jurisdictional defect in Harper’s appeal
does not stem from this Court’s earlier order in the first case. Because this
Court has jurisdiction over the second appeal from the first case, and because
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Harper has withdrawn his challenge to the district court’s probation
revocation, this Court should simply affirm the district court’s order in the
first case.
II.
This Court does not have appellate jurisdiction over
Harper’s challenges to his guilty plea in the second
case because the appeal involves new challenges not
raised in his motion to withdraw.
Harper presents two arguments in his appeal on the second case. First,
he argues that the prosecutor either agreed to recommend probation and
breached that promise; or he misrepresented that he would recommend
probation, leading Harper to miscalculate the value of the State’s concessions
and thus rendering his plea unknowing or involuntary. Br.Aplt.3, 6–15, 17–
24. Second, Harper argues that—if the prosecutor had not promised to
recommend probation—Harper’s plea counsel was ineffective for not
demanding at the plea colloquy that the prosecutor clarify or correct the
“false” statement in the plea agreement that he would recommend probation.
Br.Aplt.3, 15–16, 23–29.
Neither challenge is preserved, and under the Plea Withdrawal Statute,
this Court lacks jurisdiction over challenges to a guilty plea that are not raised
before sentence is announced. This Court has applied that rule even when a
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defendant timely moves to withdraw his guilty plea but, like Harper,
challenges the plea on grounds that differ from those raised on appeal.
In State v. Rettig, 2017 UT 83, 416 P.3d 520, the supreme court held that
the Plea Withdrawal Statute imposes “both a rule of preservation and a
jurisdictional bar on appellate consideration of matters not properly preserved.”
Id. ¶27 (second emphasis added). If the matter is not properly preserved,
appellate courts lack jurisdiction to consider it, even through plain-error
review or an ineffective-assistance challenge. Id. ¶¶27, 44, 47–51, 61. And in
State v. Allgier, 2017 UT 84, 416 P.3d 546, the supreme court explained that the
Plea Withdrawal Statute’s rule of preservation requires a challenge to be
specifically raised. Id. ¶25. It “require[s] that an issue be ‘presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that
issue.’” Id. The test is not just whether a motion was timely, but “whether an
issue was specifically raised in the district court in a timely fashion and
whether evidence or relevant legal authority was introduced to address the
issue.” Id. “The Plea Withdrawal Statute requires a defendant to take each of
these steps to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest.” Id.
Although Rettig and Allgier involved appellate review where there was
no valid motion to withdraw the pleas, this Court held in State v. Badikyan,
2018 UT App 168, 436 P.3d 256, cert. granted, 437 P.3d 1247, that under Rettig
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and Allgier a timely motion is not sufficient to grant appellate jurisdiction
over challenges not raised in that motion. Badikyan, 2018 UT App 168, ¶¶18–
22; see also Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(c) (West 2017) (“Any challenge to a
guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection (2)(b)
shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction Remedies Act,
and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.” (emphasis added)).
Although Harper timely moved to withdraw his plea, he did not
challenge his plea on the bases he now raises. In his motion, Harper argued
that he did not “appreciate[e] the full consequences of his guilty plea” for two
reasons: he was emotionally unstable because he faced the prospect of losing
custody of his son, and his attorney advised him that he would get probation
if he pleaded guilty. R938:307, 309. Harper thus claimed that he “did not
know” that he “could be sent to prison.” R938:309. He cited cases in his
motion discussing mental condition and its effect on voluntariness. R938:306–
07.
Harper never argued in his motion or during oral argument on that
motion that the plea agreement actually contained an enforceable agreement
that the prosecutor would recommend probation. R938:306–07, 631–40.
During oral argument, Harper’s withdrawal counsel did argue that the
language of the plea agreement suggested that a non-attorney would have
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understood the plea agreement to mean that “the State is agreeing that he will
receive probation.” R938:631–32 (emphasis added). But he used that language
to reinforce his argument that Harper’s plea counsel misled him, particularly
in light of Harper’s mental state at the time. R938:631–33, 639.
And Harper’s withdrawal counsel phrased the argument in terms of
Harper thinking he was guaranteed probation—not in terms of a promised
recommendation that the sentencing court had discretion to disregard. See
R938:631 (acknowledging that “we understand” that the court had discretion
in sentencing but arguing that “the problem is … that he was informed by his
attorney … that he would get probation if he pled” (emphasis added)); R938:632
(“[T]he State is agreeing that he will receive probation.” (emphasis added));
R938:632 (“And he was relying on his attorney’s representation that he will be
given probation.” (emphasis added)); R938:632 “[Y]ou wouldn’t put down a
two-step reduction if he complies with probation if there wasn’t certainly an
inference it was expected that he would get probation.” (emphasis added));
R938:632 (“[W]hat was in his mind at the time … was the representation by
this attorney that in exchange for pleading … you will get probation … .”
(emphasis added)); R938:639 (“[H]e was entering a plea based on the
statement that he would get probation.” (emphasis added)).
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The district court naturally understood these repeated references as an
argument that Harper thought he was guaranteed probation. It rejected
Harper’s argument, stating that it did not understand why Harper “would
think he had a guarantee of probation” when the court told him otherwise
during the plea colloquy and Harper reiterated at the time that he
understood. R938:639. The court also stated that disliking a sentencing
recommendation was not a valid basis for withdrawal of a plea. R938:638.
A guarantee of probation is not the same thing as a promise that the
prosecutor would recommend probation. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides an avenue for parties to commit the court to a
particular sentence. After reaching a tentative agreement, the parties may
disclose that agreement to the court before entry of a plea. Utah R. Crim.
P. 11(i)(2). “The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and
defense counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.” Id. And
if the judge later changes her mind, she must give the defendant a chance to
withdraw his plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(i)(3). That process is wholly distinct
from a typical sentencing recommendation, which the court is not bound to
accept. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(h)(2).
If Harper was really arguing that the prosecutor had promised to
recommend probation, or that Harper was misled into thinking he had,
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Harper did not present that argument “in such a way that the trial court ha[d]
an opportunity to rule on that issue.’” Allgier, 2017 UT 84, ¶25. Harper never
asked for an evidentiary hearing to create a record of what the prosecutor
promised. He never proffered his own testimony or his plea counsel’s
testimony that they understood the prosecutor had promised to recommend
probation. He never requested a ruling interpreting the language of the plea
agreement or making findings about the reasonable expectations of the
parties about what the State promised to do. He never cited any cases dealing
with the interpretation of plea agreements, breach of plea agreements, or
whether a defendant understood the value of the promises made to him. And
on appeal, Harper never tries to challenge the district court’s finding on the
claim he presented below—that Harper was guaranteed probation or at least
thought that he was.
Because no “evidence or relevant legal authority was introduced to
address the issue” Harper raises on appeal, he did not preserve his challenge.
Allgier, 2017 UT 84, ¶25; see also Salt Lake City v. Josephson, 2019 UT 6, ¶12, 435
P.3d 255 (“The party must put forth enough evidence that ‘the issue [is]
sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court.’”
(alteration in original)).
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Harper’s failure to preserve is even clearer on his second challenge—
that his plea counsel was ineffective for not insisting during the plea colloquy
that the prosecutor correct the statement in the plea agreement. Harper never
raised this objection below. Indeed, Harper effectively concedes that he did
not preserve this claim, arguing it through the lens of ineffective assistance.
Br.Aplt.1. 3, 24–29. But under Badikyan, Harper’s concession means this Court
has no jurisdiction to consider the new appellate challenge even under an
ineffective-assistance rubric. Badikyan, 2018 UT App 168, ¶¶18–22.
Harper does make passing references in his appellate brief to this claim
as if it were preserved. Br.Aplt.15, 23. But he cites no place in the record where
this issue was preserved and presents it in his issue statement as an
unpreserved claim. Br.Aplt.1–2. Harper’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea
and his arguments on that motion never addressed allegedly false statements
by the prosecutor or argued that the prosecutor was required to correct any
false statements.
Because Harper did not preserve the challenges to his plea that he now
raises on appeal, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Allgier, 2017 UT 84, ¶25; Rettig,
2017 UT 83, ¶¶26–27; Badikyan, 2018 UT App 168, ¶¶18–22. This Court should
therefore dismiss the appeal in the second case for lack of jurisdiction.
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III.
If this Court has jurisdiction over Harper’s second
case, it should affirm because Harper has failed to
carry his burden of proving that his plea was
unknowing or involuntary.
If the Court agrees that Harper’s appellate challenges are not
preserved, then under Badikyan it cannot address them even for plain error or
ineffective assistance. If, however, the Court believes that Harper’s challenge
below was sufficient to give the district court an opportunity to rule on the
issues he now asks this Court to address, then this Court may address them
on their merits. But even if this Court gets to the merits, Harper’s arguments
for withdrawing the plea lack record support. 7

The supreme court granted a writ of certiorari to review Badikyan. But
“‘[t]he fact that certiorari was granted ... does not deprive [the opinion] of
precedential value.’” Estrada v. Mendoza, 2012 UT App 82, ¶7 n.4, 275 P.3d
1024 (omission and second alteration in original). In the event that the
supreme court were to overturn Badikyan before this Court disposes of
Harper’s appeal, that may allow this Court to reach unpreserved challenges
to Harper’s guilty plea through plain error or ineffective assistance. But apart
from his claim that his plea counsel should have insisted on the prosecutor
correcting the plea statement, Harper has not presented any justification for
reaching his unpreserved challenges. Harper would not be entitled to review
of his other challenges even for plain error or ineffective assistance. See, e.g.,
State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ¶21, 167 P.3d 1046 (refusing to consider
unpreserved issue when appellant did not brief any justification for reaching
it).
7
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A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea only on “a showing that it
was not knowingly and voluntarily made.” Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a).
Harper argues that his plea was unknowing and involuntary for two
alternative reasons. First, he argues that the plea agreement obligated the
prosecutor to recommend probation, and the prosecutor’s prison
recommendation breached the agreement and rendered Harper’s plea
unknowing or involuntary. Br.Aplt.11, 16. Second, Harper argues that at the
very least, the language in the plea agreement misled him into thinking the
prosecutor had promised to recommend probation, thus causing Harper to
misunderstand the value of the plea bargain. Br.Aplt. 3, 9–13, 16–24.
The record does not support either of Harper’s alternative claims. It
was Harper’s burden to prove that his plea was unknowing or involuntary.
Any deficiency in the record must be held against Harper. First, Harper did
not establish that the prosecutor agreed to recommend probation. But even if
it did, Harper would not be entitled to withdraw his plea—at most he would

For the same reason, this Court need not stay this case or certify it to
the supreme court pending that court’s disposition of Badikyan. Either Harper
sufficiently presented his claims and this Court may reach them, or he did
not and he has forfeited them by not arguing plain error or ineffective
assistance. (As for Harper’s single ineffective-assistance claim, it is
inadequately briefed, as demonstrated in Point IV below, and thus does not
present the kind of significant issue that justifies certification.)
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be entitled to resentencing, though even that remedy is unavailable because
Harper’s continuing criminal conduct excused the prosecutor from any
obligation to recommend probation. Second, Harper did not establish that he
was misled into thinking the prosecutor had promised to recommend
probation. He presented no evidence of any misrepresentation and no
evidence that Harper actually thought the prosecutor had promised to
recommend probation.
But if this Court disagrees and believes that there is some evidence to
support Harper’s position, the most it can do is remand for the district court
to make credibility and other findings to resolve any conflict in the evidence.
A. The record does not demonstrate that the prosecutor promised
to recommend probation; in any event, the prosecutor’s prison
recommendation would not entitle Harper to withdrawal of
his plea.
Harper repeatedly refers in his brief to an “agreement for probation.”
Br.Aplt.10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. The State interprets this as an argument that the
prosecutor agreed to recommend probation. Harper argues that “the State
was obligated to keep its word,” and that its failure to do so entitles Harper
to withdraw his plea. Br.Aplt.11, 16.
But Harper assumes that the plea agreement contains a promise that
the prosecutor would recommend probation. He has never proved that key
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fact. In any event, he would not be entitled to withdraw his plea even if the
prosecutor had promised to recommend probation.
1. Harper did not prove that the plea agreement contained a
promise to recommend probation.
Harper relies on the language of the plea agreement to argue that the
prosecutor agreed to recommend probation. But the language is ambiguous,
so Harper must rely on extrinsic evidence to interpret the agreement. Because
Harper presented no extrinsic evidence to the district court that could have
established that key point, this Court must affirm.
The plea statement says, “The State agrees to a two-step 76-3-402
reduction if I comply 100% with all terms and conditions of AP&P
probation.” R938:160. Harper points out that the language does not say that
“‘if he gets probation’” the State will recommend a two-step reduction.
Br.Aplt.10. But Harper glosses over something else the language does not say:
The plea statement does not say that the State will recommend probation. It
does not even use Harper’s more amorphous phrase, “agree[] to probation.”
Br.Aplt.10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. 8
Even if the plea statement had used the phrase “agree to probation,”
that could mean five different things: agree to have the court commit to a
sentence of probation under rule 11(i); agree to recommend probation; agree
to not oppose Harper’s request for probation; agree to not oppose a probation
recommendation from AP&P; or agree to recommend probation if AP&P
recommended probation.
8
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Because there is no express agreement to recommend probation,
Harper’s argument must depend on an implied promise to recommend
probation. But it is at least equally valid to read the promise to be no more
than that the State would agree to a two-step reduction if the court had
decided to grant probation. 9

If Harper means an agreement to seek to commit the court, he has not
challenged the district court’s finding that Harper had no guarantee of
probation and that Harper understood he had no guarantee. Any such claim
thus fails at the outset. See, e.g., State v. Clopten, 2015 UT 82, ¶45, 362 P.3d 1216
(refusing to address argument where defendant asked the appellate court “to
review a decision the trial court did not make” but “failed to challenge the
decision the trial court did make”). Such a claim would also fail because
Harper has not explained why his after-the-fact declaration should be enough
to overcome the “‘strong presumption of verity’” given to his “‘[s]olemn
declaration in open court’” that he understood the court was free to sentence
him to prison. See Arriaga v. State, 2018 UT App 160, ¶15, 436 P.3d 222, cert.
granted, 437 P.3d 1247 (Utah 2019); accord State v. Archuleta, 2019 UT App 136,
¶20, --- P.3d ----.

. If Harper means an
agreement to not oppose Harper’s request for probation, the analysis in this
case would functionally be no different than if dealing with an agreement to
affirmatively recommend probation.
The reference to a two-step reduction does not by itself establish that
the prosecutor was committed to probation as opposed to prison. The statute
allows for a two-step reduction even for defendants sentenced to prison. Utah
Code Ann. §76-3-402(1), (3) (West 2015). The plea statement thus makes one
thing clear: If the court decided to sentence Harper to prison, the prosecutor
was not obligated to agree to a two-step reduction.
9
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Harper tries to buttress his interpretation of the language by arguing
that it “makes no sense” for the prosecutor to agree to release Harper pending
sentencing if the prosecutor’s “true intentions” were to argue for a prison
sentence. Br.Aplt.10. But there is nothing inconsistent with the prosecutor
agreeing to release pending sentencing but not binding himself to
recommend probation. In fact, that course is imminently reasonable. Harper’s
release gave Harper an opportunity to prove that he was a good candidate
for probation—a test that Harper ultimately failed when he assaulted his
probation officers while on release. Thus, the provision recommending
release pending sentencing does nothing to remove the ambiguity in the plea
agreement. Both interpretations are reasonable.
“Plea agreements are generally interpreted using principles of contract
law.” 10 State v. Samul, 2018 UT App 177, ¶14, 436 P.3d 298. “[A] contractual
term or provision is ambiguous if ‘it is capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or
other facial deficiencies.’” Brady v. Park, 2019 UT 16, ¶54, --- P.3d ----.
“[W]here a contractual term or provision is ambiguous as to what the parties

There is “no constitutional right to plea bargain.” Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). But if a prosecutor chooses to offer one, and
a defendant accepts it by pleading guilty, the parties ”essentially” have a
contract. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009).
10
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intended, the question becomes a question of fact to be determined by the
fact-finder” “by considering extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent.” Id. ¶53.
Thus, “[t]he underlying purpose in construing a contract is to ascertain the
intentions of the parties and to identify what the parties reasonably
understood to be the terms of the agreement.” State v. Terrazas, 2014 UT App
229, ¶27, 336 P.3d 594 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
This Court has noted that ambiguities in plea agreements are construed
against the government. Samul, 2018 UT App 177, ¶13 n.2. That rule
represents a modification of the basic interpretive rule of contracts that
ambiguities are to be construed against the drafter. See State v. Patience, 944
P.2d 381, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting that there are some “limits to the
contract analogy,” including “‘holding the government to a greater degree of
responsibility than the defendant ... for imprecisions or ambiguities in plea
agreements’”). But construing a contract against the drafter—or, in the case
of a plea agreement, against the State—is a tie-breaker rule that is to be
applied only after looking to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent.
See Brady, 2019 UT 16, ¶56 (“In the rare case where the extrinsic evidence
‘does not reveal the intent of the parties,’ a district court should then, and
only then, ‘resolve the ambiguity against the drafter.’” (footnote omitted));
Wilburn v. Interstate Elec., 748 P.2d 582, 585–86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (“[T]he
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doctrine of construing ambiguities in a contract against the drafter functions
as a kind of tie-breaker, used as a last resort by the fact-finder after the receipt
and consideration of all pertinent extrinsic evidence has left unresolved what
the parties actually intended.”). Otherwise, courts risk overriding the actual
intent of the parties.
Harper does not point to any relevant extrinsic evidence. Indeed, he
presented none below. He argues that this Court should simply accept his
“unopposed affidavit.” Br.Aplt.24. But Harper’s declaration says nothing
about whether the prosecutor promised to recommend probation. Instead, he
said only that he “thought that I would be placed on probation,” that his plea
counsel “told me I’ll get probation,” that Harper “did not know that by
pleading guilty, I could be sent to prison,” and that Harper “did not know
that AP&P would recommend prison.” R938:309.
Nothing in that proffer says that either Harper or his plea counsel
understood the language of the plea statement to contain a promise that the
prosecutor would recommend probation. In fact, it suggests the opposite.
Harper proffers that he understood that he would actually get probation. But
a promise to merely recommend probation necessarily includes the
possibility that Harper would not get it—precisely the opposite of what
Harper declared he understood the agreement to be.
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In fact, the prosecutor proffered at the hearing on Harper’s motion to
withdraw his plea that “we never talked about probation being agreed
upon.” R938:635. The prosecutor added that if there had been an agreement
for probation, “[i]t would have been in the plea form that we agree that he
gets probation and a 402 [reduction] upon successful completion.” R938:635
(emphasis added). So the only proffer of relevant extrinsic evidence in the
record defeats Harper’s claim.
Perhaps recognizing that no extrinsic evidence supports his
interpretation of the plea agreement, Harper faults the State for having
“neglected to have [Harper’s plea counsel] testify” about the plea
negotiations. Br.Aplt.24. But Harper bore the burden of proving that his plea
was unknowing or involuntary, so any record deficiency must be held against
Harper, not the State. State v. Ruiz, 2012 UT 29, ¶¶36–37, 282 P.3d 998 (“[O]n
a presentence motion to withdraw, the burden of proof is on the defendant,
who must show that his or her plea was not knowingly and voluntarily
made.”); see also State v. Archuleta, 2019 UT App 136, ¶23, --- P.3d ---(concluding that defendant failed to meet his burden when he presented no
“‘objective

evidence’”—only

“‘self-serving

statements’”

that

were

contradicted by his statements during plea colloquy); State v. Powell, 2015 UT
App 250, ¶¶6–8, 361 P.3d 143 (concluding defendant failed to meet his
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burden when evidence he presented was “thin, at best” and was contradicted
by other evidence in the record); State v. Collins, 2015 UT App 214, ¶9, 359
P.3d 664 (concluding that defendant fell “far short of carrying his burden”
when he pointed to evidence that he was confused about the details of his
plea during his plea withdrawal hearing, but no evidence that he was
confused at the time he entered his plea).
When the party that has the burden of proof in the district court fails
to put on evidence to support his claim, this Court must affirm the denial of
the claim. See State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ¶11, 76 P.3d 1159 (stating that
remand for further factual development is inappropriate where party with
burden of proof has failed to put on evidence to meet that burden); State v.
Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, ¶17 n.4, 89 P.3d 185 (same). See also State v. Alexander,
2012 UT 27, ¶¶68–69, 279 P.3d 371 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (stating that lack of evidence supporting motion to withdraw plea
should be resolved against defendant, who bears burden of proof). But see
Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ¶55 (majority opinion) (concluding that “record
nonetheless demonstrates that Mr. Alexander’s plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made”).
Harper does not rely on the many letters and pro se motions he
submitted to the court to establish the meaning of the plea agreement. But
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even if he had, it would be insufficient. After the court denied Harper’s
motion to withdraw his plea, Harper told the court in several letters and pro
se filings that the prosecutor made “a deal for probation.” See, e.g., R938:339.
But these documents do not constitute record evidence. “When a defendant
is represented by counsel, he generally has no authority to file pro se motions,
and the court should not consider them.” State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327,
¶33, 143 P.3d 302 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Finlayson,
2014 UT App 282, ¶21 n.10, 362 P.3d 926.
In any event, “a deal for probation” is not necessarily an agreement to
recommend probation. If anything, it is more consistent with Harper’s
declaration—that he understood that he had a deal that would guarantee
probation. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(i). But the district court found that Harper
had no guarantee of probation and that he understood as much. R938:639.
Further, Harper was represented by new counsel during sentencing.
His sentencing counsel was aware of these letters and was aware that Harper
wanted the district court to reconsider its denial of his motion to withdraw
his plea. R938:685–87, 734, 753. Yet his sentencing counsel chose not to file a
motion to reconsider or to present any additional evidence to the court. And
although she argued that the language of the plea agreement suggested an
agreement for probation or was at least “very confusing,” Harper’s
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sentencing

counsel

never

argued

that

the

prosecutor’s

prison

recommendation breached the plea agreement and entitled Harper to some
remedy. R938:736. Harper has not argued that his sentencing counsel was
ineffective. Given the “strong presumption” of reasonable representation,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), this Court should assume
that Harper’s sentencing counsel could find no factual basis to support a
claim that the prosecutor actually promised to recommend probation. The
best she could do on this point was appeal to the confusing language to argue
for leniency.
In short, the language of the plea agreement is ambiguous. It does not
state that the prosecutor will recommend probation and can reasonably be
read as containing no such implicit promise. Because it is ambiguous, Harper
had to present extrinsic evidence to the district court to establish that the plea
agreement contained a promise to recommend probation. He did not.
Because he failed to prove that the plea agreement contained a promise to
recommend probation, he has failed to prove that the prosecutor breached
any promise by recommending prison.
2. Even if the prosecutor promised to recommend probation,
Harper would not be entitled to withdraw his plea.
But even if Harper had made the necessary factual showing below, he
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is not entitled to withdraw his plea on this basis for two reasons. First, for any
breach of a plea agreement, Harper is entitled only to specific performance—
resentencing before a different judge where the prosecutor makes the
promised recommendation. Second, Harper is not even entitled to specific
performance because his subsequent criminal activity excused the prosecutor
from any obligation to recommend probation—Harper’s subsequent criminal
activity hindered the government and breached an implied promise not to
change the circumstances that formed a basis of the agreement.
a. Withdrawal of a guilty plea is not available as a remedy
for any breach of a plea agreement.
The State’s breach of any agreement entitles Harper only to specific
performance, not withdrawal of his plea. When a defendant pleads guilty in
exchange for a sentencing recommendation, the prosecutor’s promise “must
be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Agreeing to
recommend one thing but instead recommending another amounts to a
breach of the plea agreement. See id. at 258–59.
If there is a breach and the defendant objects, the United States
Supreme Court has held that state trial courts have the discretion to choose
between two remedies based upon the circumstances of the case: (1) plea
withdrawal; or (2) specific performance—that is, resentencing in front of a
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different judge at which the prosecutor makes the agreed-upon
recommendation. Id. at 263.
Though the Supreme Court held that the Constitution affords
defendants a remedy when a prosecutor breaches the sentencing promise, the
Court did not specify that they have a right to a particular remedy. In practice,
resentencing is preferred by far. 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law §§655–56
(Westlaw 2014) (citing cases). And the Supreme Court has never prohibited
the states from regulating those remedies. In Utah, the legislature has limited
the availability of plea withdrawal to situations where the plea was
unknowing and involuntary. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a); Alexander, 2012
UT 27, ¶23.
Breach of a plea agreement does not render a plea unknowing or
involuntary. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137–38 (2009). As the
Supreme Court explained, “it is entirely clear that a breach does not cause the
guilty plea, when entered, to have been unknowing or involuntary. It is
precisely because the plea was knowing and voluntary (and hence valid) that
the Government is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain.” Id. And
because breach cannot render a plea unknowing or involuntary, breach
cannot serve a basis for withdrawal of the plea under Utah law. See Utah
Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a).
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This Court has held that trial courts have discretion to choose the
remedy for a breach of a plea agreement. State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ¶¶9–
17, 95 P.3d 1203 (applying Santobello). But it reached that conclusion in a case
that was governed by a prior version of the Plea Withdrawal Statute, which
allowed for withdrawal upon a showing of good cause. See Utah Code of
Criminal Procedure Amendments, ch. 290, §1, 2003 Utah Laws 1321
(amending Utah Code §77-13-6, effective May 5, 2003, to change the required
showing for withdrawing a plea from good cause to unknowing and
involuntary); Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ¶4 (indicating that Smit’s sentencing
took place in 2002). It also reached that conclusion before the United States
Supreme Court clarified that a breach of a plea agreement does not render a
plea unknowing or involuntary. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137–38 & n.1
(disavowing, in 2009, prior cases that suggested a breach would render a plea
unknowing or involuntary). And more recently, this Court has held that
when a defendant alleges breach of a plea agreement but fails to comply with
the requirements of the Plea Withdrawal Statute, “the only alternative
remedy available” is specific performance, not withdrawal. State v. Saenz,
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2016 UT App 95, ¶7, 373 P.3d 220 (addressing scenario where breach was
alleged in untimely motion to withdraw plea). 11
If the prosecutor promised to recommend probation, then at most
Harper is entitled to resentencing before a different judge where the State
recommends probation. Harper never asked for this remedy from the district
court, and he does not ask for this remedy on appeal.
b. The State was excused from any obligation to
recommend probation because of Harper’s subsequent
criminal activity.
Even so, Harper is not entitled to resentencing because the State is
excused from any obligation to recommend probation due to Harper’s assault
of his probation officers between the plea hearing and sentencing.
Harper claims that even “If” 12 he committed a new offense after the
plea agreement, the prosecutor was obligated to honor his promise or “undo

After holding in Saenz that the Plea Withdrawal Statute limits the
trial court’s discretion to choose between remedies for a breach, the Court in
a subsequent case repeated the general principle that trial courts have
discretion to choose the remedy. See State v. Samul, 2018 UT App 177, ¶17, 436
P.3d 298. But that reference was dicta and should be disavowed to the extent
it conflicts with Saenz, the Plea Withdrawal Statute, and United States
Supreme Court precedent.
11

Harper refuses to acknowledge that he did commit a new offense
after pleading guilty. Br.Aplt.10, 16. Yet Harper admitted to the district court
that he violated his probation in the first case by committing attempted
assault by a prisoner. R036:480, 714, 720–21.
12
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or modify the plea.” Br.Aplt.16. He argues that any response to a new offense
had to be pursued in a separate proceeding because the plea agreement said
nothing about allowing the prosecutor to “change its mind if situation XYZ
arises.” Br.Aplt.16.
Harper cites no authority for his argument that any subsequent
criminal activity has no bearing on the State’s obligations in the plea
agreement. In fact, substantial authority supports the opposite position:
Subsequent criminal activity excuses the State from any obligation to
recommend probation.
“[W]hen a defendant, as a result of ‘plea bargaining,’ enters a plea of
guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise to recommend probation,
there is an implied promise by the defendant that the circumstances under
which the bargain was made will remain substantially the same.” State v.
Pascall, 358 N.E.2d 1368, 1369 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972). “The commission of a
crime subsequent to entering a plea agreement and before sentencing is a
change in circumstances amounting to a breach of that implied promise and
is sufficient to excuse the state from fulfilling its promised recommendation.”
State v. Tyler, 84 P.3d 567, 570 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003). “To require the
prosecutor to fulfill his promise, or to permit the defendant to withdraw his
plea, would, in effect, reward the defendant for his unlawful conduct.”
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Pascall, 358 N.E.2d at 1369. See also United States v. Delacruz, 144 F.3d 492, 494–
95 (7th Cir. 1998) (excusing prosecutor from sentencing recommendation
because defendant breached plea agreement by fleeing jurisdiction and
engaging in further criminal conduct); State v. Corwin, 93 P.3d 745, 2004 WL
1609124 at *1–2 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) (excusing
prosecutor from sentencing recommendation because defendant committed
additional felonies after pleading guilty); In re A.R.E.G., 543 N.E.2d 589, 589–
91 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989) (excusing prosecutor from obligation to recommend
lighter disposition because juvenile engaged in additional delinquent
behavior between adjudication and disposition). Cf. Patience, 944 P.2d at 387
(stating that defendant’s breach of plea agreement authorizes state to rescind
plea agreement).
It does not matter that the defendant’s obligation is implied rather than
express. United States v. Hallahan, 756 F.3d 962, 973 (7th Cir. 2014); United
States v. David, 58 F.3d 113, 115 (4th Cir. 1995); Tyler, 84 P.3d at 570; Pascall,
358 N.E.2d at 1369. And when a defendant breaches a plea agreement, he is
not entitled to withdraw from that agreement. Hallahan, 756 F.3d at 973;
United States v. Gregory, 245 F.3d 160, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2001); Pascall, 358 N.E.2d
at 1369. But see State v. Zuniga, 2002 WI App 233, ¶11, 652 N.W.2d 423
(rejecting excuse analysis and concluding that proper remedy under
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Wisconsin law is vacating plea agreement and guilty plea). “‘[A] classic rule
of contract law, is that a party should be prevented from benefitting from its
own breach.’” Hallahan, 756 F.3d at 973 (alteration in original). “Otherwise, a
party would have the power to escape an unwanted contractual obligation
simply by breaching another provision of the contract under which it arises.”
Id.
Although most courts view this problem through the lens of changed
circumstances, hindrance provides another basis for excusing the State from
recommending probation. “[E]very contract contains an implied condition
that each party will not unjustifiably hinder the other from performing.”
23 Williston on Contracts §63:26 (4th ed.). The United States Supreme Court
recognized the potential applicability of this doctrine to cases like this. In
Puckett v. United States, the government agreed to argue for a three-level
sentencing reduction based on acceptance of responsibility. Puckett, 556 U.S.
at 131. But when Puckett committed another crime before sentencing, the
government opposed any sentencing reduction. Id. at 132. Although the
government conceded on appeal that it had breached the plea agreement, the
Court noted that an argument that “ongoing criminal conduct hindered
performance … might have convinced us had it been pressed.” Id. at 140 n.2.
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When the State recommends probation, it implicitly warrants to the
district court that the defendant is an appropriate candidate for probation.
When the defendant commits further criminal activity after the State agrees
to recommend probation and before sentencing, the defendant has
unjustifiably and substantially hindered the State’s ability to fulfill its
obligation. At the very least, the defendant has breached the agreement by
changing the circumstances in a material way, fundamentally altering a key
consideration that the State’s promise was based on—the defendant’s
criminal history and risk assessment. When Harper assaulted his probation
officers after pleading guilty in the second case, the State was excused from
recommending probation in the second case—to the extent it ever promised
to do so.
C. Harper has not proven that he was misled into genuinely and
legitimately thinking the prosecutor had promised to
recommend probation.
Harper argues that even if the prosecutor had not promised to
recommend probation, the language in the plea agreement misled Harper
into thinking the prosecutor had, thus causing Harper to misunderstand the
value of the plea bargain. Br.Aplt. 3, 9–13, 16–24.
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Again, Harper has failed to point to any evidence that could establish
his claim that the prosecutor misled Harper into thinking the prosecutor had
promised to recommend probation.
To be voluntary, a plea must be entered “without undue influence,
coercion, or improper inducement.” State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 338–39
(Utah 1977). Thus, a defendant may establish that a plea was involuntary if it
was induced by a “‘misrepresentation’” that “at the time of contracting” the
prosecutor intended not to perform. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 138 n.1.
To be knowing, a plea must be made “with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The attendant circumstances and likely consequences of
which the defendant must be aware include “‘the actual value of any
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.’” Id.
at 755. 13

Courts and litigants often use knowing and voluntary interchangeably.
See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). While there may be
some overlap in the concepts, knowingness generally relates to the facts and
law of which a defendant must be aware to intelligently plead. See Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). On the other hand, voluntariness refers
to the requirement that the plea not be the product of state coercion or
improper inducement. Forsyth, 560 P.2d at 338–39.
13

-44-

Thus, a defendant may establish that his plea was unknowing if “he
was misinformed as to the true nature of the charge against him” or other
attendant circumstances or likely consequences of his plea, see Bousley v.
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619 (1998) (emphasis added), and as a result the
defendant was “genuinely and legitimately confused,” State v. Copeland, 765
P.2d 1266, 1274–75 (Utah 1988). 14 “If a prosecutor makes misstatements and
the defendant relies upon the misstatements, a substantial question arises as
to whether [the d]efendant knowingly and voluntarily entered into a plea.”
State v. Magness, 2017 UT App 130, ¶22, 402 P.3d 105.
For example, in Magness, this Court held that the defendant was
entitled to withdraw his plea where the prosecutor promised to recommend
probation as long as the victim did not ask for a prison sentence, and the
prosecutor mistakenly said at the time of the plea that the victim did not at
that time plan to ask for a prison sentence. Id. ¶¶7, 25–28.
But this Court also cautioned that if the defendant “simply
miscalculated the likelihood” of a certain outcome without any misstatement

A showing that the defendant was misled or misinformed may not
always be required to show that a plea was unknowing. See Copeland, 765 P.2d
at 1274–76. But Harper has based his claim that he did not understand the
true value of the plea agreement solely on the premise that he was misled.
Br.Aplt.6–24.
14
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by the prosecutor that induced that miscalculation, “a basis for withdrawing
the guilty plea would likely not exist.” Id. ¶29. When a defendant has been
informed of the likely consequences and the commitments made, and then
with the assistance of counsel decides to plead guilty, it is not enough to show
that the defendant miscalculated or misjudged the likelihood of a particular
sentence. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630–31 (2002); Bousley, 523
U.S. at 619; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797–98 (1970); McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769–71 (1970); Brady, 397 U.S. at 756–57.
“[T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently
involves the making of difficult judgments.” McMann, 397 U.S. at 769. “[T]he
Constitution … does not require complete knowledge of the relevant
circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea … despite various
forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor.” Ruiz, 536
U.S. at 630. Thus, a defendant cannot show that his plea was unknowing
when he “did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his
decision,” or when “his calculus misapprehended … the likely penalties
attached to alternative courses of action.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 756–57. “[A] mere
subjective belief of a defendant as to potential sentence, or hope of leniency,
unsupported by any promise from the prosecutor or indication by the court, is
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insufficient to invalidate a guilty plea as involuntary or unknowing.” State v.
Garfield, 552 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah 1976) (emphasis added).
Harper argues that he was misled by the written plea agreement.
Br.Aplt.3, 9–13, 16–24. He does not argue that he was misled by the court or
by defense counsel. 15 And he does not point to anything other than the
written plea agreement as the source of any misinformation. Rather, he claims
that the prosecutor made a “false” promise, promising to recommend
probation while his “true intentions” were always to argue for imprisonment.
See Br.Aplt.3, 9–13. He thus argues that he was “misled” into pleading guilty
by the prosecutor’s “bait-and-switch,” making his plea involuntary.
Br.Aplt.11, 13. He also appears to argue that even if the prosecutor did not
lie, the statement in the plea agreement was still misleading and caused
Harper to miscalculate the value of the bargain he had received, thus making
his plea unknowing. Br.Aplt.16–24.
Harper has pointed to no evidence to support his allegations that the
prosecutor intentionally misled him. The allegations are baseless. This Court
should reject out of hand any claim that Harper’s plea was induced by a
promise that the prosecutor had no intention of keeping.

Harper argued below that his counsel misled him. R938:307, 309. But
he has abandoned any such claim on appeal.
15

-47-

To the extent Harper also argues that the prosecutor misled him—
inadvertently or unintentionally—by the wording of the plea agreement,
Harper has not proven that Harper was genuinely and legitimately misled by
any such misstatement.
Even assuming that the ambiguity in the statement, coupled with the
prosecutor’s proffer that there was no agreement for probation, were enough
to establish that the prosecutor misstated his intent by agreeing to the
language in the plea agreement, Harper also had to prove that he was
“genuinely and legitimately confused” about the terms of the agreement as a
result. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1274–75. Harper proffered nothing below to
establish that he actually thought the prosecutor had agreed to recommend
probation. As discussed, Harper’s declaration stated that he thought he
would be placed on probation and that his plea counsel told him as much.
But Harper never declared that he believed the prosecutor had promised to
recommend probation. During the hearing, his withdrawal counsel never
proffered anything to indicate that Harper genuinely and legitimately
believed the prosecutor had agreed to recommend probation. And for the
reasons stated in Point III.A.1 above, Harper’s letters and pro se motions are
insufficient to establish that he genuinely and legitimately believed the
prosecutor had promised to recommend probation. If those documents and
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the facts behind them supported a finding that Harper’s plea was
unknowing, Harper’s sentencing counsel would have asked the court to
reconsider its ruling. 16
Harper has not pointed to any evidence to show that his expectation
that he would get probation for pleading guilty was anything other than an
ordinary “misapprehension” of the likelihood of a particular outcome. Ruiz,
536 U.S. at 630. Harper and his plea counsel “simply miscalculated the
likelihood” of probation, without any misrepresentation by the prosecutor.
Magness, 2017 UT App 130, ¶29. That is not enough to prove that his plea was
unknowing or involuntary. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630–31; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 619;
Parker, 397 U.S. at 797–98; McMann, 397 U.S. at 769–71; Brady, 397 U.S. at 756–
57.
In short, Harper did not create a record below to show that the
prosecutor misled him and that Harper genuinely and legitimately, but
mistakenly, believed the prosecutor had agreed to recommend probation.
Because Harper did not meet his burden below, this Court should affirm.

As explained above, the letters and motions refer to an agreement or
deal for probation. If Harper meant that he thought the parties had agreed to
ask the court to commit itself to a probation sentence through rule 11(i), the
district court’s unchallenged finding that Harper understood he was not
guaranteed probation forecloses that argument.
16
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D. At most, Harper would be entitled to a remand for further fact
findings.
If this Court believes there is some evidence to support either a claim
that the plea agreement contained an enforceable promise to recommend
probation, or the prosecutor misled Harper into thinking as much, this Court
may at most remand for further fact findings by the district court. 17
If there is any evidence to support Harper’s challenges, it does not cut
solely in his favor. The prosecutor proffered that there was no agreement for
probation. R938:635. And as shown, there is no existing proffer to support
Harper’s assertions that there was a promise to recommend probation. Even
Harper’s repeated references in his letters and pro se motions to an agreement
for probation—which could mean several different things—are suspect. That
proffer was made after the court denied Harper’s motion to withdraw. Cf. Lee
v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017) (“Courts should not upset a plea
solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would
have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies. Judges should instead look

If this Court believes that remand is necessary, and if it also agrees
with the State that the prosecutor was excused from any promise to
recommend probation, then the Court should limit any remand to the
question of whether Harper was genuinely and legitimately misled by the
language in the plea agreement.
17
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to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed
preferences.”).
So the best Harper could hope for is a remand to take evidence on
whether there was an agreement that the prosecutor would recommend
probation or whether Harper genuinely and legitimately thought there was
as a result of the language in the plea agreement. That may very well require
resolving conflicting evidence, including determining witness credibility.
“[I]t is not the function of an appellate court to make findings of fact because
it does not have the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses testify.”
Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979). As noted, when a contract
is ambiguous, “the question becomes a question of fact to be determined by the
fact-finder.” Brady, 2019 UT 16, ¶53 (emphasis added).
Because the district court has yet to hear evidence on what the parties
agreed to or thought they agreed to, and has yet to make fact findings on the
key issues in this case, this Court may not reverse and direct the district court
to allow Harper to withdraw his plea; at most the Court may remand for the
district court to make the required findings. See Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273–76
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(remanding for findings on plea withdrawal motion); Garfield, 552 P.2d at
130–31 (same). 18
IV.
If this Court has jurisdiction over Harper’s ineffectiveassistance claim, it should reject the claim as
inadequately briefed.
Harper argues that if the prosecutor never promised to recommend
probation, he was required to correct the contrary, “false” statement in the
plea agreement and that Harper’s plea counsel was ineffective for not
demanding at the plea colloquy that the prosecutor do so. Br.Aplt.15, 23–29. 19
Harper has not adequately briefed his claim. He does not explain how
his plea counsel was deficient or how any deficient performance prejudiced
him. Nor has he made a record sufficient to establish ineffective assistance.

The State maintains that the district court did not make findings
because Harper never asked it to and never offered the requisite evidence to
support the arguments he now makes—thus illustrating the lack of
preservation that deprives this Court of jurisdiction. Alternatively, the State
contends that the district court did not make findings because Harper did not
carry his burden of presenting relevant evidence to allow the court to do so.
Only if this Court disagrees with both positions should it remand for further
findings and credibility determinations.
18

This Court cannot, consistent with Badikyan, address the merits of an
ineffective-assistance claim raising a challenge not raised in Harper’s motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. Supra Point II. However, the State addresses
Harper’s ineffective-assistance claim out of an abundance of caution. The
Court may reach this claim only if the supreme court were to overrule
Badikyan while this case is pending. See Estrada, 2012 UT App 82, ¶7 n.4
(stating that cert. grant does not deprive case of precedential value).
19
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To prove that his plea counsel was ineffective, Harper must prove both
that his plea counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced as a
result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–89, 694 (1984). This is a
“heavy burden,” id. at 687–89, and “never an easy task,” Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
Deficient performance requires proof that Harper’s plea counsel’s
representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Counsel is always “strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance.” Id. at 690. To show otherwise, Harper must
prove that “no competent attorney” would have proceeded as his plea
counsel did. Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 124 (2011). To show prejudice,
Harper must show that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Harper does not explain how his plea counsel was deficient. Harper
argues that the prosecutor was obligated to correct any misstatements in the
plea agreement, and Harper cites Napue v. People of State of Illinois, 360 U.S.
264 (1959), in support. Br.Aplt.15, 23–29. In Napue, the Supreme Court held
that the State must correct “false evidence” when it appears. 360 U.S. at 269.
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Although Harper spends several pages in his brief explaining why the
prosecutor supposedly violated Napue, Harper gives scant treatment to the
controlling issue on appeal—why his plea counsel was deficient for not
raising the issue. Harper concludes that his plea counsel “rendered
ineffective and deficient performance when he failed to point out and/or
clarify the lack of probation representation in the plea form to the court and
the prosecution.” Br.Aplt.27–28. But a single sentence asserting that counsel
was deficient for not raising the issue is inadequate to carry Harper’s burden
of proof on appeal. “This is merely rephrasing that which must ultimately be
shown to satisfy the … the Strickland test … .” Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870,
877 (Utah 1993). That “is clearly insufficient to affirmatively demonstrate”
deficient performance. See id.; see also State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 ¶18, 345 P.3d
1226 (stating that an appellant who does not support his argument with
authority or analysis will ordinarily fail to meet his burden).
The question on appeal is not whether the prosecutor violated Napue,
but whether all reasonable attorneys would have recognized and raised a
Napue claim. See McMann, 397 U.S. at 770–71 (deficient performance analysis
turns “not on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel’s
advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases”); State v. Vallejo, 2019
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UT 38, ¶¶69–70 & n.13, --- P.3d ---- (addressing whether counsel’s
performance was reasonable without addressing whether objection would
have succeeded). Harper has done nothing to meet that standard.
For example, Harper has not explained why all reasonable attorneys
would have recognized the statement in the plea agreement as a “false
statement.” As explained in Point III.A.1 above, the statement in the plea
agreement can reasonably be read as not promising to recommend probation.
If a reasonable attorney could interpret the statement that way, then counsel
could reasonably decide there was no false statement to correct. “The
presence of ambiguity defeats [Harper’s] argument that his counsel was
ineffective.” Samul, 2018 UT App 177, ¶¶15–16 (rejecting claim that counsel
was ineffective for not alleging breach of plea agreement, because plea
agreement was ambiguous).
But even if every reasonable attorney would have read the statement
as promising to recommend probation, Harper has pointed to no record
evidence to explain how his plea counsel, or any other reasonable attorney,
would have known “at the time of the plea” that it was false—that the
prosecutor did not intend to recommend probation. Br.Aplt.15. If the written
plea agreement is read the way Harper insists, then the soonest any of
Harper’s counsel would have become aware that the prosecutor did not
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intend to recommend probation would have been at the hearing on the
motion to withdraw the plea, where the prosecutor stated that there was no
agreement on probation. But by that point, the prosecutor had corrected any
“false statement” by clarifying that there was no agreement on probation.
R938:635. In other words, the prosecutor did exactly what Harper argues his
plea counsel should have asked him to do, and at the soonest point that this
record establishes that a reasonable attorney would have been alerted to the
issue. 20
Harper’s prejudice argument is similarly truncated. Although he
quotes extensively from Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017), to
demonstrate how prejudice should be analyzed in a plea context, he baldly
asserts that “[h]ad prior counsel appropriately clarified the State’s lack of
probation recommendation in the plea agreement, … Harper would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Br.Aplt.29. Again,

To the extent Harper argues that the prosecutor intended to
recommend probation, that the language of the plea statement is “false” in
that it does not contain a promise to recommend probation, and that his plea
counsel should have asked the prosecutor to clarify the language to add a
promise to recommend probation, see Br.Aplt.28, Harper has not shown that
the record established the predicate fact that the prosecutor ever intended to
recommend probation.
20
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this is “merely rephrasing that which must ultimately be shown to satisfy the
second prong of the Strickland test.” Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 877.
Harper’s declaration never states that he would have insisted on going
to trial if only he knew that the prosecutor was not recommending probation.
That is fatal to his claim. “[I]n order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
His argument as to why he would have insisted on going to trial cannot
substitute for a proffer that he in fact would have so insisted. See id. at 60
(rejecting petitioner’s claim because he did not allege in his petition for
habeas relief that he would have rejected plea and insisted on trial had
counsel given him correct advice). But in any event, Harper’s argument
(elsewhere in his brief) as to why it would have made sense for him to insist
on going to trial is contradicted by the record. Harper suggests that getting
probation was “a determinative factor” in deciding to plead guilty.
Br.Aplt.12. He thus analogizes to Lee, where the Supreme Court held that a
defendant was able to show that going to trial would have been a rational
choice because avoiding deportation “was the determinative factor for him”
and trial gave him a slightly better chance of that. 137 S. Ct. at 1967–69. But

-57-

the question here is whether getting a recommendation for probation was the
determinative factor. If actually getting probation was the determinative
factor, as Harper suggests, then a promise that the prosecutor would merely
recommend probation would not have been enough to induce Harper to
plead guilty because the court could easily reject the recommendation.
Further, the record does not clearly establish that getting a promise to
recommend probation—or even actually getting probation—was the
determinative factor for Harper. Although his declaration states that he did
not know that he could be sent to prison by pleading guilty, he also identified
other considerations: his plea counsel allegedly told him he would “never see
[his] son again unless [he] plead[ed],” and during the plea colloquy Harper
said he wanted to plead because he wanted to be released from custody
immediately, which was part of the plea agreement. R938:160, 309, 595. And
although Harper’s withdrawal counsel referred to Harper pleading “as
charged,” R938:631–32, a criminal trespass charge was dismissed as part of
the plea agreement, R938:160. Harper cannot show on this record that getting
a probation recommendation from the State was the determinative factor and
that he would have insisted on going to trial if his plea counsel had clarified
that the prosecutor was not promising to recommend probation. See Hill, 474
U.S. at 60 (rejecting petitioner’s challenge to plea when he “alleged no special
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circumstances that might support the conclusion that he placed particular
emphasis on [the subject matter of his counsel’s bad advice] in deciding
whether or not to plead guilty”).
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction over Harper’s ineffectiveassistance claim, because Harper has inadequately briefed his claim, and
because he has not created a record to support his claim, this Court should
dismiss the claim—even if it remands for factual development on Harper’s
other claims. Harper had the chance to create a record below. He had the
chance to file a motion for remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure. He should not get two bites at the apple.

CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the first case because Harper has withdrawn
his claim of error on appeal. The Court should dismiss the second case for
lack of jurisdiction because Harper raises new challenges to his guilty plea on
appeal. But if this Court concludes that it has jurisdiction, it should affirm
because Harper failed to prove that his plea was unknowing or involuntary.
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Addendum A
Statutes and Rules

Utah Code Section 77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea (West 2017)

(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the
court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held
in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence
may not be announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in
abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of
pleading guilty or no contest.
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction
Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Utah R. Crim. P. 11. Pleas (2016)
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented
by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant
shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to
confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by reason of

insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the alternative not
guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.

(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be set

for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an early
trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel,
of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:

(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the
right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction;

(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if
used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established that
the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to inquire
into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
for setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make
a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g) If the defendant pleads guilty, no contest, or guilty and mentally ill to a
misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code Section 77-361, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the
plea, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm
or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the plea invalid or form the
basis for withdrawal of the plea.
(h) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has agreed to
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or
the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be approved or rejected by
the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court shall
advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is
not binding on the court.

(i) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement
and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge
may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether
the proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in conformity
with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant and then call
upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.

(j) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant
may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest,
reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the
adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who
prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(k) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the
other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a reasonable
time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code
Ann.§ 77-16a-103.
(I) Compliance with this rule shall be determined by examining the record as a
whole. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Failure to comply with this rule is
not, by itself, sufficient grounds for a collateral attack on a guilty plea.

Addendum B
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment
(R938:549-50)

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: December 22, 2017
05:09: 19 PM
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STA.TE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MINUTES

Plaintiff,

SENTENCE, cTTIDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 161911938 FS

ERNEST CLAYTON HARPER,
Defendant.

Judge:

KATIE BERNARDS-GOODMAN

Date:

December 21, 2017

Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

PRESENT
Clerk:

katiej

Prosecutor: DEESING, ANDREW K
Defendant Present
The defendant is in the custody of the Salt Lake County Jail
Defendant's Attorney(sl: CARAM TANGARO
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 27, 1971
Sheriff Office#: 294536
Audio
Tape Number:

W43

Tape Count: 1017-1136

This case involves domestic violence.
CHARGES
l. STALKING - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty

- Disposition: 04/14/2017 Guilty

2. CRIMINAL TRESPASS - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty

- Disposition: 04/14/2017 Dismissed w/ Prejudi

HEARING

Defendant transported from ADC.
all cases.

Defense addresses the Court regarding a resolution of

Defendant enters an admission to allegation 2 in the affidavit.

Defense

00549
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Case No: 161911938 Date:

Dec 21, 2017

addresses the Court regarding the status of case 151908678 and order to show cause in
case 131401036 and gives argument on the guilty plea being enters as to a lesser charge
on 161911938.

State argues for guilty plea to the current charge.

10:38 AM
Ms. Lorie Hobbs, attorney for victim, addresses the Court regarding 131401036 and gives
a brief history.
10:48 AM
All parties discuss the history of the cases.

Victims address the court.

11:36 AM
***The Court hereby orders defendant to serve 0-365 days jail with the option to serve
at the Utah State Prison on case 151908678 and 171907138, 1-15 years at the Utah State
Prison on case 161911938 and 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison on case 131401036 all
to run concurrent to each other.

The Court recommends the defendant receive credit for

283 days time served.***
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of STALKING a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff:

The defendant is remanded to your custody for

transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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AddendumC
Transcript of Argument &
Ruling on Motion to Withdraw Plea
(R938:629-40)

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT L.Ai_'\E COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)
)

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,

vs.
ERNEST CLAYTON HARPER,
DEFENDANT.
_____________

) Case Nos. 161911938
)
151908678
)
171907138
)
171907785
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Transcript of:
MOTION TO WITHDRAW PLEA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE KATIE BERNA.RDS-GOODMAN

SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 SOUTH STATE STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114

AUGUST 11, 2017

TRP\.NSCRIBED BY:

Susan S. Sprouse, RPR, CSR
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APPEARANCES

1
2

4

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Andrew K. Deesing
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
111 East Broadway, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

5

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
6
7

8

Rudy Bautista
BAUTISTA BOOTH
215 South State Street, #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

9

10
11
12
13
14

15

16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

2
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1

August 11, 2017

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

* * *
MR. BAUTISTA:

4

5

matters?

THE COURT:

6

7

10

No. 58, State of Utah versus Ernest

Clayton Harper [inaudible]
All right.

8

9

Can you address the Ernest Harper

I have all the motions that have been

filed regarding Mr. Harper's case, the motion to withdraw his
plea and the State's response.

11

MR. BAUTISTA:

Your Honor, and in response to the

12

State, the most concerning issue in this matter is if you look

13

at the statement of defendant that was filled out by

14

Mr. Peterson signed by the State and in view part of the record

15

[inaudible] guilty plea.

16

agrees to a two-step 76-3--402 reduction if I 100 percent

17

I comply 100 percent with all terms and conditions of AP&P

18

probation.

19

is for the Court's determination and discretion.

20

It indicates in there that the State
if

All we have here is we understand that sentencing

But the problem is is that he was informed by his

21

attorney to the courts that he was told that he would get

22

probation if he pled as charged.

23

the problem is if you read the statement of defendant, it

24

clearly would imply to someone, especially not legally trained,

25

that the State is agreeing to a 402 -- two-step 402 reduction

He did plead as charged.

And

3
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1

as long as he complies with all the conditions of probation and

2

advised the State is agreeing- that he will receive probation.

3

.AJ1d that's the problem here.

4

We understand that at the time he entered his plea,

5

that the Court did inquire with him and made sure that he

6

understood that you decided the sentence.

7

replied that he did at that time.

8

And he did it and

In his affidavit he purports that he was so stressed

9

out and so much under tension to get out of jail to take care

10

of his son that he was concerned about that he in essence was

11

willing to agree to anything.

12

attorney's representation that he will be given probation.

13

And he was relying on his

And in light of the statement of defendant that was

14

signed by the defendant, written by his lawyer, you wouldn't

15

put down a two-step reduction if he complies with probation if

16

there wa.sn' t certainly an inference it was expected that he

17

would get probation.
If it had said if he's given the privilege of,

18

19

probation or the State agrees to a two--step if he's given

20

probation, that "if" language, unfortunately the language in

21

there signed by Mr. Peterson and the State doesn't have an

22

"if".

23

to do is go through what was in his mind at the time, his mind

24

at the time was the representation by this attorney that in

25

exchan9e for pleading as charged, you will get probation and he

And so since he's a lay person, and what we are trying

4
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1

accepted that deal.

And he was also told that he would be

2

released pending .sentencing.

3

the time.

That part was complied with at

4

So what we're asking the Court is notwithstanding the

5

colloquy that was inside the court is to understand that he was

6

under such duress and anguish.

7

that they are aware that he has either more health issues or

8

serious personality disorder issues that have arisen from being

9

a victim of crimes himself.

And

AP&P

has -- has documented

In light of the mental state that he was in at that

10
11

time, of having

12

of his son, the representations of his attorney supported by

13

inference by the statement in it, we're asking the Court to

14

allow him to withdraw his plea because it wasn't knowing and

15

voluntarily done at the time in his mind.

16

it.

wanting to get out of custody to take care

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. DEESING:

And so we'd submit

The State's response'?
Arid Judge, we've briefed this fairly

19

extensively.

20

yesterday, and wee-filed, I think, at some point yesterday.

21

Attached to that is the transcript of the hearing.

22

it's not an official transcript.

23

internally within our office.

24
25

I delivered a copy to Your Honor's chambers

Admittedly,

It's one that we did

But if we look at the transcript of what actually
occurred at the time he plead guilty, none of what :Mr. Bautista

5
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1

has represented seems to be backed up by this transcript.

2

I'm referring to the defendant's statement where after, after

3

this -- after we told the Court that, look, this isn't

4

something that appears that it's going to work, he clearly is

5

minimizing his action -- and I'm on page 2 of the transcript --

6

he says, "Your Honor, rigt1t now I'm extremely nervous because I

7

realize that the penalty of this could put me in prison and I'm

8

obviously not trying to go that -- go there.

9

that, Your Honor."

10

And

I do realize

So if he'd been promised probation by his attorney in

11

the back, why in the world would he come up here thinking that

12

he was going to go to prison?

13

It doesn't make any sense.

And this knowing and voluntary is very clear.

It

14

doesn't mean that he gets to come here today and say, look, I

15

have PTSD, which when the AP&P officers who supervised him

16

testified last week at the hearing for his assault on those two

17

officers, when they took him into custody, neither one of those

18

officers were aware of any sort of diagnosis form or otherwise.

19

So what he's provided to the Court is some sort of

20

documentation from some sort of social worker at the jail that

21

has somehow diagnosed him with PTSD.

22

they do that or if they are even qualified to be doing that,

23

but it's certainly not something that this court should be

24

looking at when we're looking at whether or not the plea was

25

knowing and voluntary.

I'm not entirely sure how

6
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If you listen to the hearing, and Your Honor was

1

2

there, it's a very clear Rule 11 colloquy.

3

up and say, look, we can give you a trial date on the 25th,

4

he -- you then give him another opportunity, because it was so

5

abundantly obvious that he wanted to plead guilty.

6

told him, "You just can't plead guilty to get out of jail."

7

you look at the transcript, we withdrew that recommendation

8

prior to completing whereas we are no longer recommending that.

9

So even hearing that, that we're no longer

Not only do we back

And you had

10

recommending that he be released, he still asks to plead

11

guilty.

12

So what -- what's in the plea form we see all the

13

time.

14

That's fine.

15

If

That if I'm given probation, it's a 402 reduction.
It's fairly cornrnon language.

We don't have testimony from Mr. Peterson, and I

16

suppose we could wait and have him testify.

17

remembers exactly what was said back there because it just

18

doesn't seem like he's going to remember an exact conversation.

19

But I can represent that we never talked about probation being

20

agreed upon.

21

that he gets probation and a 402 upon successful completion.

22
23
24
25

I doubt he

It would have been in the plea form that we agree

So we'd ask the Court to deny his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea and sentence him today.
MR. BAUTISTA:

The problem is, Your Honor, is that

the plea form doesn't say, "If he gets probation."

It says he

7
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1

will get a two-step 402 reduction if he complies with

2

probation.

That kind of

THE COURT:

3

He understood that prison was a

4

possibility.

I told him I could sentence that and he said this

5

could send me to prison.

6

MR. BAUTISTA:

7

THE COURT:

8
9

He understands that.

But I told him not to plead just to get

out.

MR. BAUTISTA:

Understand.

But it's -- his -- his

10

testimony by affidavit is that that, that was not his

11

understanding at the time.

12

what -- what needed to be done to get out of custody, take care

13

of his son, and that he was -- and he wouldn't -- he hadn't a

14

problem with the plea if AP&P had recommended probation.

1 C.

where the recommendation of prison and the State recomt1ending

16

pri.son, it's made him get in a position where he's realized the

17

mistakes that were entered upon and he was -- he's purporting

18

that he was misled into that.

,..)

19

That he was -- he was telling me

But

And that's the problem we have.

In addition, his supervising agent, Agent

20

Sutterfield, testified that he wasn't aware that his actual

21

mental health diagnosis, whether it was bipolar, schizophrenic

22

or such, but that he was aware that he had no health issues.

23

A..nd so they were -- A..P&P was aware that there are issues there.

24

Just he wasn't aware of the actual diagnosis.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.

My concern is you have evidence,

8
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1

an affidavit from him, if we don't have testimony from

2

Mr. Peterson

3

Wt1at we have is the hearing, Judge.

MR. DEESING:

4

And the case law is pretty clear that this decision is very

5

much in the district court's hands.

6

whether or not you feel that the Rule 11 colloquy was --- was

7

appropriately given.

8

Rule 11 colloquy, what the Supreme Court has said is when you

9

go through Rule 11, most of these issues are foreclosed,

It 1 s up to you as to

And when we look at the case law on that

10

because we've walked through all of this.

11

all these questions.

12

So you've asked him

The issue today is whether he understood the charges,

13

which when we look at the transcript, it's abundantly clear

14

that he understood them.

15

you, which through his minimization of the charges, that's what

16

leads us this down a bad path to begin with.

17

understand that sometimes you can call somebody a jerk."

18

goes through that whole conversation.

He, in fact, explains the charges to

So he understands his constitutional rights.

19
20

walked him through every one.

21

everyone.

22

conseei'"L1ences of the plea.

23

He said, "Yeah, I
He

You

Mr. Peterson walks him through

We know that from the affidavit and the likely
We have that in his own words.

So I didn 1 t subpoena 1'1r. Peterson because we really

24

don't need to know what's in Mr. Peterson's head because we

25

have the transcript of the very hearing where the defendant

9
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1

clearly understands what's going on.

2

hearing where he just .simply said yes or no to all of your

3

questions, yeah, it may have been a little bit different

4

situation.

5

testify.

6

needs -- that you need to explain to him.

7

If this was a standard

We rnay have had to have his attorney come and
Here, he is elaborating on the very rights that he

THE COURT:

Well, I find it very difficult to think

8

that ~tr. Peterson would have ever told him that there wasn't a

9

possibility of prison and that what the sentence was would be

10

up to the judge.

11

slow down and back up, to not do this just to get out and to

12

understand that prison was a potential here.

13

I told him as well.

I tried to get him to

.i'md then we have a motion to withdraw the plea, which

14

comes only after he finds out he has a prison recommendation,

15

which is not a legitimate reason to withdraw a plea when you

16

don't like the recommendation for the .sentence.

17

to deny his motion to withdraw.

18

MR. BAUTISTA:

So I'm going

If I may clarify a couple of points,

19

Your Honor.

20

Mr. Peterson prior to the presentence report when he was taken

21

back in custody by AP&P, that he wanted to withdraw his plea at

22

that time prior to it.

23

He has informed me that he actually conveyed to

In addition, the concern I have with the State's

24

position is if the standard is if Rule 11 has been complied

25

with, then we are done, then the standard of whether his plea

10
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1

was knowing and voluntarily made is disingenuous.

2

is a blanket protection; therefore, it was complied with before

3

his plea must have been knowing and voluntarily done, then

4

he -- to say that you have the right to petition for -- to

5

withdraw your plea if you can show you did not do it knowing

6

and voluntarily has no weight.

7

If Rule 11

It's a meaningless protection.

The concern here is that in essence he waived his

8

constitutional rights.

He waived a right to a trial and to not

9

plead guilty, and he pled guilty as charged presumably for

10

something in return.

11

guilty pleas as charged with no consideration.

12

It's not normal for defendants to enter

And the problem is the statement of defendant does

13

say, it doesn't .say "if".

14

that it was -- that he was entering a plea based on the

15

statement that he would get probation.

16

Arid so that supports hi.s position

In addition, by withdrawing his plea, it doesn't make

17

him a free man, it just puts him back in the position

18

beforehand, and the State can still proceed and prove him

19

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if they can do so.

20

THE COURT:

Well, I don't understand why he would

21

think he had a guarantee of probation when I told him you have

22

the potential for one to 15 years at the Utah Prison, a $10,000

23

fine with a 98 percent surcharge, something less may be

24

recommended but I could sentence to that max1rnum if I choose.

25

Do you understand that?

And he sa_j_d,

11

I do, ma' am."

11
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He also himself volunteered that he knew that this

1

2

could put him in prison.

To say now that he didn't understand

3

prison was a possibility, I just find it difficult to believe.

4

I see no reason to allow withdrawal of this plea at this time.
Your Honor, in regards to sentencing,

MR. BAUTISTA:

6

he asked me ear lier this morning

7

if his motion was denied.

8

for a motion hearing and motion hearing only.

9

because his mother and grandmother --

10

THE DEFENDANT:

he would be sentenced today

I told him my understanding, it was
He said good

My surrogate sister -- my sister said

11

they wanted to be here on my behalf, but they have no plans to

12

be here because it's a motion hearing.

13

So she can't be here except in .spirit .
MR. BAUTISTA:

14

My mom has passed away.

We're asking if we may set sentencing

15

over so that he can be in that position.

16

fault; it's mine, because I did tell him that I didn't think

17

I thought we would be doing the motion and then setting it

18

over.

19

THE COURT:

20

THE DEFENDANT:

21

MR. DEESING:

And this is not his

We can set it over.
Thank you.
Judge, if we're going to set it over,

22

we just simply ask we set it in a week.

The victims are here.

23

They've been here multiple times for sentencing.

24

continuation of victimizing these poor women is the State's

25

position on it.

It's a

12
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AddendumD
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea
(R938:154-64)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE GOUNlY;-STATE OF UTAH
EN EL TR1BUNAL JUDICIAL DEL TERCER DISTRITO
CONDADO DE SALT LAKE, ESTADO DE UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
ESTADD DE UTAH

Plaintiff,
vs

Demand ante

[~yu~i

~
lf
eindant
Acusado.

..

-.

..

...

..
..
..

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUilTY PLEA
AND C_ERTIFICATE··oF
COUNSEL
AFIRMACION DEL ACUSADO
EN APOYO A SU DECLARACION

DE CULPABILIDAD Y CERTIFICADO

DELASESORLEGAL ·

Case No. I_&

/qrr q38= F.s

No. de caso.

Y o , - - - - - - - - - ~ por media de la siguiente reconozco y certifico que
he sida asesorado y que entiendo los siguientes hechos y derechos:
.
·

Notification of CJ:iarges
Noffficaci6n de Cargos

· J am pleading g ~ r ~ n t ~ o the fol{oWing crimes:
Me declaro culpable (o sin argumento) de los siguientes delitos:

00154

..

Crim~ & Sta~ry

· Degree

Provision

Punishment
Min/Max and / or

~inimum Mandatory
Delito y provisiones estatutarias

Grado

Pena Min/Max y/o
Minimo Mandatorio

A

B.

G.

D.

I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. l have read it.
or had.it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which
I am pleading g u i l t y ~ ·
He recibido una copia (reforma~a) del Documeni:o aCtJsatorio en mi contra Lo he !erdo,
o me lo han leido y entiendo la naturaleza y las elementos del(os) delito(s) por el (los) cual(es)
me deciai-o culpable (o si11 argumento).

.. .: - .... ....: __ ..... · ---- ........... _______ ., ·..

00155

The elements of the crime(s) to which I am.pleading guilty (or no contest) are:
Los elementos del Oos) derrto(s) por el (Ios) cuaJ(es) me declar.o culpable (o sin
argumento) son:

'h,

T
111

CQ.

~

M C11.s Q_ 1 }Jfo I

:¼, ,lllrl o. \'IA ~~"j

ti I• =.

l~~m

I un erstand that by pleading guilty J will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed· above. (.Gf;-tf-1 am pfesding no co11twt, J fll1f1iofci5ntesfing U1at I comrmtf:ed--1-1th-HC0.....__··. ~gQil tg cfil i !~)- I stiQ!-]l~te_ and agr~Jor, IT I _am R.leadif!g no co11tE?st. I do f}pt qisP.ut~
or oon:test) that the following .facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other
persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to
accept my g1..1_ilty ( ~ l e a s and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I
am pleading guilty~ conte.;t},;
. Entiendo que al declaranne culpable estare admitiendo ·que cometf e! delito (las delitos)
mencionado(s) anterionnente. (0, si me declaro sin argt.nnento, no disputare que cometf los
delitos que anteceden). Yo estipulo y estoy de acuerdo (o si me deciar~ sin argument□, no
disputo ni refuto) que los siguientes hechos describen mi conducta y la conducta de otras
personas por las cuales soy responsable legalmente_ Estos hechos pro_veen las bases para
que el tribunal acepte mi declaraci6n de cufpabilidad (o sin argum~nto) y comprueba las
elementos de! delito (I s derrtos) por el cual (las cuales} me estoy declarando culpa le
argumento

eMtJ~tm ~~$ lo.-Bte,· IIDJ~ i.M .lwkf: ~ · p ~~"5 ~ '
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
Renuncia de Ios derechos consf:itucionales
I am entering these pleas voluntarily'. I understand that I have the following
rights under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. l also understand that
if i plead guilty (Df<-~t} I will give up all the following rig_hts:
Doy esta declaraci6n voluntariamente. Entienda que tengo los siguientes eerechos
bajo la consf:ituci6n de utah y de las Estados Unidos. Tambi~n entiendo que si me declaro
culpable (o sin argument□) renunciare a·!os siguientesrlerechos
-----

-- - -- -- -

~

----- --

------- - -

----

~--- -

- ---

-- -

- ----- - -

.

- - -- -- -
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Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if
I cannot afford one, an attorney wili be appointep by the court at no cost to me. I
understand that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay
for the appointed lawyer's service to me.
Asesoramiento: Se que tengo eJ derecho de ser representado por un abogado y que si
no puedo costear uno, se me asignara un abogado -par parte def tribunal sin costo alguno para
mL Entiendo que posteriormente, si el juez determinara que soy solvente se me requerira
pagar p o
Is r
se.~
·aos del abogado que ~e fue asignado.
.

·
J (h ve o (have) waived my rightto counsel. If.I have waived my rightto
counsel, I
done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following
.reasons:
.
He (no he) renunciado a mt derecho de asesora miento legal. Si he renunciado a mi
derecho de asesoramiento legal, Io he hecho a sabiehdas, inteligente y voluotariamer.ite
por las siguientes razones:

If I have waived my rights to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement
. and that I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I
am pleading guilty (or no contest). I also understand m¥•.rights in this case and other
cases and the consequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea(s).
·
Sf yo he renunciado a mi derecho de asesoramiento legal, certffico que he Iefdo esta
afirrnaci6n y que 'entiendo la naturaleza y los elementos de los cargos y delitos por las cuales
me declaro culpablff (a sin argumento). Tambien ~ntiendo mis derechos en este caso y otros
casos y las consecuencias de mi(s) dedaraci6n{es) de culpabilidad

ff I av: not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
..-J:;.-q.-1-'4-,a.+-+~'4-Jb_.,_....._. My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement. my
rights, and tfie co sequences of my guilty (or no contest) plea{s).
Si no he renunciado a mi derecho de asesotia legal, mi abogado es
- - - - - - - - - - : . - - ~ Mi abogado y yo hemes platicado a fondo de esta afirmacion, mis
derechos y las consecuencias de mi{s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad {a sin aryumento)

Jury7"rial: I know that t have a right to a speedy and public bial by an impartial
(unbiased) jury and ~at I will be giving up that right by pleading gui~f« s,.:mte:sij.
Juicio por jurado. Se q1,1e tengo el derecho a un juicio publico y sin demora ante un
jurada imparcial (sin prejuicio) y que estare renunciando a ese derecho al declararrne culpable
( o ~in argurnento).

Confronfatior:i and cross-examination of witnesses: J know that if I were to
have a trial,
a) I would have the right to see and observe the wffnesses who tesfified
against me and b) my attorney, or myself if !waived my rJghtto an attorney, would
have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me.
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Careo y contra interrogatorio de Jos testigos. Se que si tuviera unjl!icio, a) Tendrfa
el derecho de very observar a los testigos que tesffliquen en mi contra y b) mi abogado, o yo
si renunciara. a mi derecho de abogado, tendrfan la oportunidad de contra interrogar a todos
Ios testigos que testifiquen. en mi contra.
Right to compel wimesses: l know that if l were to have a trial, l could call
witnesses if l chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the
·
attendance and testimony of those witnesses. : If I could not afford to pay for the
wttnesses to appear, the state would pay those costs. ·
.·
..
Derecho de··obligar a testigos. Se que si tuviera un juicio, podria elegir llamar a
testigos, y podria obtener comparendos requiriendo la asistencia y testimonio de esos
testigos. Si no pudiera costear el pago de los tesfigos, el Estado.cubriria las costas.

Righfto testify and privilege against self-incrimination: l know that if J were
to have a mar, I would have the right to testify on.my own behalf. · I also know that if J
cJ,..._gse r:iot to t$stify, no on.e 9ould make me--~tify or-make me give evidence against.
myself. I also ki:iow that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be toJd-tbai they· couldnot hold my refusal to testify against me.
Derecho a testificar y f;!I privilegio en contra de Ia auto-incriminacion. Se que si
que si no
tuviera un juicio, yo tendria er derecho de dar testin;ionio a mi favor. Tambien

se

deseara testificar, nadie podrfa obligarrne a dar testimonio o presentar pruebas en contra de
mi mismo. Tambien se que si yo eligiera no dar testlmonio, al jurado se le indicaria que no
podrfan usar mi decision en mi contra.
Pr~umption of innocence and ·hurden of proof: I know that rf I do not plead
guiity (or no contest), 1am presumed innocent uhtil the State proves that I am guilty of
the charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead
"not guilty," and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have.the
burden of proving each element of fhe charges{s) beyond a reasonable doubt ff the
trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would
have to find me guilty.
Presuncion d~ iriocencia y responsabilidad de prueba. Se que si .no me declare
culpable {o sin argument<;>), se me presume ser ino~nte hasta que la fiscalfa compruebe que
soy culpable de! Oas) delito(s) imputado(s). Si elijo pelear las cargos en mi contra, solo
necesito declararme "no culpable,• y mi caso sera fi]ado parajuicio. En eljuicio, la fiscalfa
tendrfa la responsabilidad de comprobar cada uno de las elementos de! (Ios) cargo(s} mas alla
de una duda razonable. Si el juicio fuera ante un juraqo, el veredicto debera ser unanime,
quiere decir que cada miembro del jurado tendra que ·encontranne culpable

I understand that.if I plead guilty (or Fl® ~crttest), I give up the presumption of
inno~ence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
·
Entiendo que si me declare culpable {o sin argumento), renuncio a Ia presunci6n de
inocencia y admitire que cometi el (los) delito(s} previamente mencionado(s).
·
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Appeal: I know that unde,r the Utah Cons~on, if I we~ convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not
afford the costs of an appeal, the Slate would_pay those costs fur me. I understand..
mat I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). I
understand that if I wish to appeal my senfence I must file a notice of appeal within 30
days after my sentence is entered.

Apelacion. Se que bajo la Constib.Jci6n de Utah, si fuera condenado por un jurado o
juez, tendrf a el derecho de apelar mi condena y sentencia Si no pudiera costear las costas de
la apelacion, el Estado cubriria esas costas. Entiendo que al declararrne culpable (o sin
argumento) renuncio a mi derecho de apelar mi condena. Entiendo que si deseo apelar mi
sentencia debo presentar notificaci6n de mi apelaci6n dentro de treinta dfas despues de
asentada mi sent£:ncia
.
'

· . I know and understand thatbt pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up
all the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
·

~~-Y. e11t:iEIDfl.9 .QAe i!-I pec.la.rar.me..culpabJ~.r.erumcio y c.erlo. t-edos mis derechos
estatutarios y constitu.cionales previamente explicados.- .. . .
Consequences of Entering a Guilty

f6i" Niitfo, 1®) Plea

Consecuencias de dar una declaraci6n de culpabilidad ( o sin argumento)

Potential penalties: I know fue maximum sentence that may be imposed for
each crime to which I am pleading guilty
y p..........,..·~~w+
o
carries man
eta setving'"a manda'tmy-fl □ nalty-for that srime.
. prison term, fine, or both.
Penas potenciales~ Se la pena maxima que se podria irnp~ner por cada delito del
ct1alme estoy dedarando culpable {o sin argumento). Se que al decfararme culpable (o sin
argumento) de un delito que lleve consigo una pena obligatoria, me estare sujetando a servir
Ja pena obiigatoria por ese delito. Se que mi sentencia puede incluir un tennino en la prisi6n,
una multa o ambos
·

l know that in addition to a fine, an nin~ty percent (90%) surcharge wm be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any resmution that may be owed on charges thiif are dismissed as
part of a plea agreement
.
Se que auhado a una multa, se impondn:i un noventa porciento (90%) en n::cargos.
Tambien se que se me podri~ ordenar"reintegrar a cualquier vfciima de mis delitos, induyendo
reintegro que se deba por cargos que sean desestimados coma parte del trafo declaratorio.
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Conse~utive/concurrent prison terms: I know that if there is more than one
crime involvea, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or
they may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an
additional fine for eaeh crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or
parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or
'which I have plead guilty (or no confest), my guilty €@!; &a~JJI 1tesj;) plea(s) now may
result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense to which.I am
now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states
on the record that consecutive sentences would !Je inappropriate.
Terminos de plisi6n consecutivos/simultaneos. Se que si hubiera mas de un delito
involucrado, las ·penas podrian ser irnpuestas una despues de la otra (consecutivamente), o
podrian ser s~rvidas al mismo tiempo, (simultaneamente). Se que se me podria cobrar una
multa adicionaJ por cada defrto por el cuaJ haya dado mi declaraci6n. Tambien se que si estoy
bajo libertad provisional o preparatoria, 6 si estoy esperando recibir sentencia por algun otro
_,dettf:o,..-wr~J.. ~!J_?,J.Jli!.Y.g. pid_o_ conde~.....do o r-F1e:l_li;y_a:d~q~-culpaple-Eo.~in argumi;;n.te.Lmi(s). declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin argumento) que doy ahora podrian resuttar en la
imposici6n de sentencias consecutivas. Si el delito por el cual me. estoy declarando culpable
sucedi6 cuando me encontraba preso o bajo libi;rtad preparatoria, se que Ia Iey requiere que
el tibunal imponga sentencias consecutivas a menos que el tribunal fa!le y haga constar em el
acta que las sentencias consecutivas serian inaprcjpiadas.
..

Plea agreement: My guilty (or~plea(s({is?ar'e)) (is/are not) the result
ofa plea agreement between myself and the prosecutin~ey. All the promises,
· duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained in this
statement, including those explained below:
.
Trata declaratorio. Mi(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin argumerfto) es (son) el
resultado de un trato declaratorio que tie hecho con el abogado fiscal. Todas las promesas, ·
deberes y provisiones de este trato declaratorio, si hubiera alguno, se encuentran en su
totalidad en esta ~rmacion, inclt,Jyendo aquellas expficadas a continuacion:

e:.~~1¥ttf~= tmd I ,:&aiu ,6· k WW

.

I I
-!oo.. . --~p'1,~i ~o"
~ r i a l judg6~:: I know 1ha~y charge Qr s~ncing concession or l-P .I eo"""'

. UhfW'-l

.

· d

,, 1k£i

~f-km_~

recommendation of probation or suspended ~enfence, including a reduction of the fO'Jl/p IOi~
charges for sentencing, made or sought by _either defense counsel or the prosecuting~d ~l~~
attorney are not bindi[1g on the judge_ I also know that any opinions they express to ot' W,f\)
me as to what they beITeve the Judge may do _a~e not binding on the judge. _

fo~o~.
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El juez de primera instancia µo esti obligado. Se que cuaJquier cargo, o concesi6n
de sentenc;;ia o recomendaci6n de Jib.ertad condicional, o sentenciasuspendida, incluyendo
una reclucci6n de los cargos para el dictado de Ia sentencia, que haya sido hecho o solicitado
ya· sea por el abogado de defensa o el fiscal no son obfigatorias para el juez. Tambien se que
cualquier idea expresada ante mi concemiente a lo que se piensa que el juez pueda hacer no
son obligatorias para el juez.
ImmigrationlDeporfation: I understand that if I am not a United States citizen,
my plea(s) today may, or even will, subject me to deportation under United States
immigration laws and regulations, or otheiwise adversely affect my immigration status,
which may include permanently barring my re-entry into the United States. l
understand that rf l have quesiions about the effect of my plea on my immigration
status, I should consult with an immigration attorney.
_
lomigraci6n/Deportaci6n: Entiendo que s1 no- soy ciudadano de las Estado Unidos,
mi(s) declaraci6n(es) deJ dia de hoy podria, o cier.tamente me sujetara a deportaci6n bajo las
_Jey.~ Y..r~erg~~~~~-Jm1-t~~~i6~_ ~~~~~~s~~? 1:J!1!~o.:>~2. d_e_<?~_.IJ!~n~13_ af:e~~n. __
negativamente m1 estaao m1gratono, que podna mdu1t el 1mpedir mt reingreso a Ios Estados·

·. ·f:ff-dfib~'Entienao que si tengo preguntas acerca de! efecto que tendra mi declaraci6n de
culpabilidad en mi estado migratorio, debo consultar con un abogado de emigraci6n.

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
Certfficaci6n de voluntariedad def acusado
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty$ ne~ ? promises excepfthose contained in this statement have be~n made to

ma

-

Estoy dando esta declaraci6n por mi propia y libre voluntad. No se han utilizado fuerza
ni amenazas o coacci6n de ningun tipo para cgnvencerme de declaranne culpable (o sin
·
argumento). Nose me ha hecho ninguna promesa con excepcion de aquellas que se
encuentran en esta afinnaci6n .

.

1have read this_st.rl:ement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and 1·
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am
free to change or· delete anything contained in this statement,_ but l do not wish to
·make any changes because all of the statemenls are correct.
He leido esta afirmaci6n, o me la ha lefdo·mi abogado, entiendo sus contenidos y
adopto cada afumaci6n aqui contenida coma mia propia. Se que soy libre de cambiar o borrar
cualquier afirmaci6n contenida en este documento pero no deseo hacer ning(m cambio
porque todas las afirmaciones en este son correctas.

I am satisfied witlradvice and assistance of my attorney.
Estoy satisfecho(a) con el asesoramiento y servicio de mi abogado{a).

0016{··
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I am lf
vears of age. I have attended school through the ~ r a d e . I
can read an~rstand the Ermlish language. If l do not understand English, an
interpre~1::r has been provided to me.• I was not under the influence of any drugs,
medication, or intoxicants which would impaifmy judgment when I decided to plead
guilty. I am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants
which impair my judgment
Tengo _
afios de edad. He asisfido hasta el _ _ grado escoiar. Puedo leery
entender el idioma ingl~s-. Si no enfiendo el ingles, se me ha proporcionado un interprete. No
me encontraba bajo la influencia de ningun estupefaciente, medicina, o embriagante que .
pudiera impedir mi sano juicio 9.la@..Q _decidi dec!ararme culpable. En este momenta no me
encuentro bajo la influencia de n1?igun estupefaciente, medicina, o embriagante que pueda
impedir mi sano juicio.
.
I believe myself to be of sound and _discerning mind and to be mentally capable
of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of
.. ai:iy_qien~l qi~~a~~ ~@f~, !mP§I]i:rp.ent tl:lc:t ~quid PJJ;ll.er.u me. fro!TI~~nderstanging
. what I am doing or from knowingly,.intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea.
Me considero de mente sana, ·capaz de discemiry entender este procedimiento y fas
· consecuencias de mi declaraci6n. Estoy fibre de cualquier enfermedad mental, defecto 0
impedimenta que me evite entender lo que estoy hacienda o que evite que de mi declaraci6n
a sabiendas, inteligente y voluntariamente.

.or

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty ~Bi'ife:st) plea(s), I
must file a written motion to withdraw my pfea(s) before sentence is announced.
I under.stand that for a plea held in abeyance, a mofion to withdraw from the plea
agreement must be made within 3(? days of pleading guilty or no contest I will
only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show that it was not knowingly and
· voluntarily made. I understand tha~ any challenge to my plea(s) made after
sentencing
. must be pursued under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Tit[e 78
Chapter 35a, and Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

.

Enfiendo .que si quisiera retirar mi(s} declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin
argumento}, debo presentar una petici6n escrita para refirar mi(s) declaracion(es) antes
que se pronuncie la sentencia. Entiendo que par,t una Declaraci6n en suspenso, fa
peticion para retiranne del trato dec~e..~torio debe ser hecha dentro de freinta dfas de
mi declaraci6n de cuf pabilidad o sin argumento. Solamente se me pennifira retirar mi
declaraci6n de culpabilidad si demuestro que no fue dada a sabiendas y
voiuntariamente. Entiendo que para disputar mi(s} declaraci6n(es) de cufpabifidad
despues de recibida sente,ncia debere hacerlo bajo Ia Ley de Remedios Postcondenat<:>rios Tm.do 78, Capitulo 35a, y Ia Regla 65C del las Reglas def Procedimiento

la

Penal de Uf:ah.

Dated t h i s ~ day of
Fechado este dfa

'r

2op

de _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ del20__.

~-----DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE
ARMA DELAGUSADO
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Certificate of D_efense Attorney
Certificado del abogado defensor

I certify that 1·am the attorney for _ , ; , . c =_ _ _ _ _ _lr".L"-"-+~-----' the
defendant above; and that I know he/she has read the sta. e nt or that I have read it
to him/h_~r. I have discussed it yvith him/her and believe that he/she fully understands
..the meaning of its contents and is merrtally and physically competent To the best of
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the
crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's-criminal conduct are correctly ·
stated; and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the
defendant in the foregoing affidavit:, are accurate and true.
·
. Certffico que soy el abogado de
·
. el acusado
previamente mencionado, y que se que el/ella ha leido la afirmaci6n o que yo·se Ia he lefdo a
el/ella; He hablado con eUeila de esta afirmaci6n y me parece que el /ella entiende
=completa.rnente ~nfficade-de·sl=f-CGntenido.-y,.e~. cempetente. fisica--y rnentalmente. Ami leal
saber y entender, despues de una invesfigaci6n apropiada, os elementos del(los) delito(s) y (a
sinopsis de los hechos de la conducta penada del acusa
o co ectos;
, · nto con los
·· otros comentarios y aseveraciones hechos por el acusa em I a avit pre
·rrectos y
verdaderos.
I

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
Certificado de! abogado fiscal

1he ~1\lF lnel,l:ata of lJ1ah in the case against · .
fu~~~
. I.am,defendant
rhave reviewed this Statement of Defendant and

find that theci:ual basis of fue defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes fue
offense(s) is true and correct Na improper intlucements, ihreats, or coercion to
. encourage a plea has been offered to defendant The plea negotiations are fully
contained in th~ Statement a~d ilJ~,-,ij~~~,J?l~?.f\9reeIJ1ent or as supplemented
on the record before the Cour[·:·Tuere ~ reasonable cause to believe ihat the
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for fue offense(s} for which fue
plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public

interest
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Certifico que soy el abogado representando al Estado de Utah en el caso en contra de!
acusado
.
. He repasado esta Afirrnaci6n de! acusado y
encuentro que Jos hechos en los que se basa la conducta penal del acusado constftuyen·el
delito y son verdaderos y correctos. Nose ha ofrecido al acusado ningun incentive, amenaza
o intimidaci6n para alentar su declaraci6n. Las negociaciones para Ia dec!aracion se
encuentran en su totalidad en esta afirrnaci6n y en el Trato declaratorio adjunto, se han
suplementado en el acta ante ef tribunal. Hay causas razonables para creer que la evidencia
respaldara la condena del acusado par el (J[?s) defrto(s) por el (los) GUal {cuales) da su(s)
declaraci6n(es) y que Ia aceptaci6n de la(s) declaraci6n(es) servira Ios intereses def publico.

Al-~DRNEY
. Bar No.\

2>1'1()

ABOGADO FISCAL
.
No. ~ef cofegio de abogados

·

----

·order
Orden

Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement ~nd the certifications of
the defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court
~itnesse~ the signatures and finds the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily niade.
·
Basa<;!o en las hechos previamente presentados y en la certfficaci6n deI(a) acusado(a)
1
y su asesor juridico, y_ basado en las affrrnaciones dadas ante el tribunal, el juez coma testigo
d~ las firm as falla que la(s) declaraci6n(es) de culpabilidad (o sin argumento) de! acusado ha
(han) sido dada(s) libre, a sabienc;ias y voluntariamente

·

·

·

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED thattlie·defendanfs guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to
the crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
POR LO TANTO SE ORDENA que la(s) declaraci6n(es) de·culpabilidad (o sin
argumento) de! acusado presentada en esta Afinnacion, sea aceptada y asentada.

Dated this

[ v{ day of

/J-p µ"' /

,2012.

Distlict Court Ju ge:
JUEZ DEL TRIBUNAL DE D!STR!TO
10/1 D felony plealcd

..
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Addendum E
Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea &
Declaration of Ernest Clayton Harper
(R938:306-11)

Rudy J. Bautista (8636)
BAUTISTA, BOOTH & PARKINSON, PC
215 South State Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-6666
Facsimile: (801) 618-3835
Email: rudy@bbpdefense.com

Attorne_vsfhr Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY

STATE OF UTAH,

PLEA
Plaintiff,
Case No. 161911938

vs.
ERNEST CLAYTON HARPER,

Judge Katie Bernards-Goodman

Defendant.

Ernest Harper, by and through counsel, Rudy J. Bautista, respectfully moves this Court to
withdrav.r his guilty plea to Count l, Stalking, a second-degree felony. tendered on April 14,
2017.
Utah law permits a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty "upon leave of the court and a
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made ... before sentence is announced.''
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-13-6(1). Whether the withdrawal is permitted is ''within the sound
discretion of the trial court." State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040. l 041 (Utah 1987). However,
such motions should "be liberally granted."

hL. at

1042.

In cases determining whether a confession is voluntary or coerced, Utah courts have considered
the defendant's "mental condition a more significant factor in the 'voluntariness' calculus." State v.

00306

Rcttenbergct, 1999 UT 80,984 P.2d 1009, 1014 (Utah 1999) (guoting Colorado v. Conncllv, 479 U.S.
157, 164 (1986)). The 1Jtah Supreme Court has thus set fo1th that, in such an analysis of voluntariness,
·'courts must also consider such factors as the defendant's mental health. mental deficiency. emotional
instability, education, age, and familiarity with the judicial system." Rettenberger, 984 P.2d at IO 14
(citing Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 712 (1967) (education); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
602-03 (1961) (mental deficiency); _$.pano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,322 (1959) (emotional
instability); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191,193 (1957) (mental health)).
In his Declaration, Mr. Harper details that he suffers from PTSD and depression, and has
panic attacks when confronted with stress. See also Mental Health Treatment Plan, dated July 12,
20 I 7, filed as non-pub! ic information. Mr. Harper is also currently facing the possibility of
losing custody of his son. Under these stressful circumstances, Mr. Harper's emotional instability
prevented him from kno\vingly and voluntarily appreciating the full the consequences of his
guilty plea, especially also taking into account his interpretation of his attorney's advice at the
time.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant respectfully requests this Court withdraw his guilty
plea made on April 14, 2017.
DATED this 8th day of August, 2017.

Isl Rudv J. Bautista
Rudy J. Bautista
Attorney for Mr. Harper

2

00307

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the MOTION TO WITHDRAW

GUILTY PLEA was e-filed, on this 8th day of August, 2017 to the following:
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
l 11 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

/s/ Shamim Monshizadeh

,.,
,)
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Rudy J. Bautista (8636)
BAUTISTA, BOOTH & PARKINSON, PC
215 South State Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (80 I) 364-6666
Facsimile: (801) 618-3835
Email: rudy(q}bbpdefense.com

AttorneysfiJr Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUD1CIAL D1STR1CT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

DECLARATION OF ERNEST
CLAYTON HARPER

Plaintiff:
vs.

Case No.161911938

ERNEST CLAYTON HARPER,
Defendant.

Judge Katie Bernards-Goodman

l, Ernest Clayton Harper, hereby declare, as follows:
l. l am the defendant in the above-numbered case.
2. On April 14, 2017, I pleaded guilty to count 1, stalking, a second-degree felony.
3. 1 thought that I would be placed on probation, and maybe some jail.
4. I did not know that by pleading guilty, l could be sent to prison. I did not know that AP&P
,vould recommend prison.
5. Michael Peterson, my attorney at the time, told me I'll get probation and I should plead
because of that.
6. Mr. Peterson also told me I would never see my son again unless I plead.
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7. 1 have panic attacks ,vhcn confronted with ove1whclming stress. I also have PTSD and
depression.
8. I am terrified of losing my son. l believe my wife wants me to go to prison so that she can
take my son away from me.

I declare under penalty of pc1jury that the foregoing is true and correct and would be my
testimony if I were testifying in a court of law.
Dated this 8th day of August, 2017.

/s/ Ernest Clayton lfarper
Ernest Clayton Harper
Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
l HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the DECLARATION OF

ERNEST CLAYTON HARPER was e-filed, on this 8th day of August, 2017 to the following:
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
111 East Broad,vay, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Isl Shamim Monshizadeh
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